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M A R X I S M AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
BY P A U L A .

BARAN

My topic tonight is one which by profession I am hardly qualified to discuss. I am an economist, and my concern with psychoanalysis is only marginal. If nevertheless I am going to speak about "Marxism and Psychoanalysis," it is because as a social scientist and as a
Marxist I have to consider the social process as a whole; I have to
study the phenomena which play a major role in the social life of our
time. And it is a fact which we should face squarely: psychoanalysis
today exercises an influence which is probably more pervasive than
that of any other doctrine or school of thought which contributes to
the formation of our "collective mind." It would be instructive to poll
this large audience and to find out how many came here tonight because Marxism appears in the announcement and how many because
of their interest in psychoanalysis.
Ever since Marxism stepped upon the intellectual stage as a
powerful effort to understand historical development, its most important bourgeois adversary has been what I may call "psychologism."
Although appearing in different forms, assuming different guises, and
presented in different terms, psychologism has always rested on two
main pillars: first, the reduction of the social process to the behavior
of the individual; and second, the treatment of the individual as
governed by psychic forces deriving thek strength from instincts which
are considered to be deeply imbedded in "human nature," with
"human nature" in turn constituting an essentially stable, biotically
determined structure.
Gradually, in the fight of far-reaching changes in the real world
and of accumulating historical and anthropological knowledge, these
concepts became increasingly untenable, and traditional psychologism
was forced into the background. What took its place is a new version
This is the reworked transcript of the author's lecture delivered at the
Tenth Anniversary meeting of MONTHLY
REVIEWin New York on May 19,
1959. Paul Baran is Professor of Economics at Stanford University and the
author of MR Press book The Political Economy of Growth.
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of psychologism: an amalgam of Freudian psychoanalysis and some
quasi-Marxian,mciological noti-a
doctrine which I propose to
call ''socio-psychologism,'s Thir new arrival on the ideological scene
distinguishes itself from its defunct predecessor by recognizing freely
that the individual is not entirely a man for himself but is influenced
by society, is somehow affected by the social setting within which he
grows up. What is crucial, however, is that society in sociopsychologism is viewed as "environmmt": family, occupational stratum, interracial relations, residential community, and the like.
We must realize the implications of both positions. In the first, if
it is "human natud' that determines the historical process, and if this
"human nature" is unalterable, then all attempts to achieve a radical
transformation of the huqan character and of the foundations of the
social order are necessarily docaned to failure. In that case we might
as well give up all hope for a :society without exploitation of men by
men, without injustice, without war, because all these things-exploitation, injustice, war-are the ineluctable result of the everlasting properties of the human animal. Encapsulated in his perennial "nature,"
man is eternally condemned to live down his original sin; he can never
aspire to a free development in a society governed by humanism and
reason. It hardly needs adding that what follows from these premises
is a conservative or indeed a reactionary attitude towards all the burning issues of our time, an attitude close to the heart of the most "oldfashioned" elements of the ruling class.
Different conclusions &eqe from socio-psychologkm~For the
propositio~that human development b determined by the social
"milieu" and depends on the nature of inter-personal relations-on
conditions obtaining within thC f k d y and so forth-leads obviously
to the' conclusion that significant changes (improvements) in human
existence can be brought about by suitable "adjustments" in the prevailing environment. More togetherness and love, more schools and
bpitals, and more coops and family wu1seIing services then become
the appropriate response to the human predicament in our society.
As in the case of all id601ogies, n e i t h a ~ p s y c h o ]nor
. ~ sociopsycho1~
.is a mere halluckg&m wholly unrelated to the real
world. Each reflects, albeit in a distorted, ideological manner, an aspect of the actual, existential condition of men in capitalist society.
By enunciating a manifest li&the
power of the individual
in our society-psychologism points unmistakably to the lonebess, un-
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relatedness, and impotence of men under capitalism, and thus comes
nearer truth than the WOW
liberal claptrap treating "us" as ccmtruUing.and shaping our lives, ol ponWicating about national or even
int&tional 6ccommunities''determining their own destinies. Shdasly, in raising the principle homo homini lupus to the status of an
eternal verity, in considering ,man to be by nature a selfish, aggressive
monad fighting ruthlessly for a place in the market, psychologism cap& more of the capitalist n d i t y than those doctrines which would
ha& us believe that the character of the capitalist man
be changed
by s a n c t i m d v ~incantations concerning love, productivity, and the
brotherhood of men. For, with exploitation, injustice, and war having
molded for centuries the character of men, treating the existing human
species as a formidable rock not easily displaced or transformed is undoubtedly more appropriate than the view of the superficial meliorist
who would reshape human attitudes by intensified preaching, by larger
federal grants-in-aid to education, by strengthening the Pure Food and
DrugAdminktration, or by electing a Democratic President.
Socio-psychologism, too, xnirro~simportant aspects of our society.
By uncovering the horrors of our cultur+the dismal state of our educational system, the misery of our cities, the abominable "climate" in
which Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and unemployed whites live
in this country-socio-psychologism is nearer the realities of capitalism
than the enthusiastic celebrators of free and unhampered private enterprise. At the same time, by attributing this social condition to "our"
l&k of enlightenment, to "oui' incapacity for purposeful action, to
the power of "conventional wisdom," and to similar psychic "facts," it
expresses the refusal to see the fundamental causes of the existing
mdl'aise, a refusal that constitutes the characteristic and indeed decisive elemkt of the ruling ideology. Moreover, the insistence of sociopsychologism on the curability of all of these ills by means of various
add sundry "adjustments" is part 'and parcel of the spirit of manipulation in which the Big Business executive "fixes" the problems confrontin; & corporation by such methods as establishing recreation facilities
f o i his workers, or appropriating more money for market research or
a d ~ d s i n g or
, by initiating some fancy product variation. Thus sociops~chologhmbecomes one of the most important components-if not
the .most
.
important component-of the ideology of monopoly capitalispl which+eeks to find ways of elkbating the most crying i r r a t i d -
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ties, the most conspicuous injustices of the capitalist system in order to
. preserve aid-tostrengthen its basic institutions.
But to realize and to unveil the ideological nature of both psychologism and socio-psychologism is only one part of what needs
to be done. Even this job can be-adequately performed only if the
differences between the two doctrines are clearly understood, and if
this ideological development is carefully analyzed as a refledon (and
an aspect) of the transformation of the underlying economic, social,
and political reality itself. Yet, as in the case of most problems posed
by the emergence and evolution of monopoly capitalism, Marxism has
been seriously remiss in coping with this matter. Failing to distinguish
between old-fashioned psychologism and its modern, more sophisticated offshoot, Marxists, both in the West and in the USSR, have
been seeking to refute the latter by employing arguments applicable
only to the former. This has been particularly tempting since marshalling the arguments called for little effort: all of them are readily available in the works of Marx and Engels, as well as in the writings of
later Marxists.
Even more serious is that another, equally important part of the
Marxist commitment has been left unattended to. This is the separation of the wheat from the chaff, the distillation of whatever genuine
scientific insights may be submerged in the ideological flood of sociopsychologism. For to the development of Marxism nothing is more
essential than the systematic identification and absorption of such
scientific advances as are attained by bourgeois scholarship-accompanied by relentless unmasking and debunking of its manifold ideologidal ingredients.
doctrine which is the
Thus in dealing with psychoanalysis-a
mainstay of socio-psychologism and which differs significantly from
earlier theories underlying psychologism-Marxists have taken the
position that all of it is nothing but ideology void of scientific content.
This attitude has been based to a large extent on the notion that
Freud's abiding concern with the irrational underpinnings of the conduct of men is tantamount to glorification of irrationality, to its elevation to the status of the ultimate, inexplicable, irreducible determinant of human activity. If such had been Freud's view, there would be
little indeed .to distinguish him from all and sundry philosophers of
romanticism and existentialism. Yet although Freud undoubtedly had
strong .tendencies in that direction-particularly apparent in s o k of
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his later writings-the bulk of his work is inspired by a different intention. Having recognized what is undisputable-that
irrationality
governs a large part of human behavior-Freud directed most of his
life's effort to an attempt at a rational understanding of irrational
motivations. Far from conside+g irrationality to be an elemental
phenomenon inaccessible to scientific analysis, Freud sought to develop a comprehensive theory providing a rational explanation of irrational drives.
To be sure, this ambitious goal remained beyond Freud's reach.
Nevertheless, he took the matter further than anyone before him, andI might add-anyone after him, even if he did fail to arrive at a satisfactory concept of human conduct. And just as Marxism has been the
heir and the guardian of what is most valuable and progressive in
bourgeois culture, so it is incumbent upon Marxism today to take up
Freud's work .where Freud left it, and to turn his insights to good use
in the elaboration of a rational theory of human activity.
I submit that only Marxism is able to fulfill this task. For the
M e a n theory of social dynamics sheds penetrating light on the
factors principally determining human behavior. What is needed is
to revive some of the central-albeit neglected-strands in Marxian
thought, and to focus them on the problem at hand. While this claim
of mine cannot be fully substantiated in a short lecture, I would like
to attempt a cctelegram-style"outline of the relevant considerations.
I t is fundamental to the Marxian approach to the study of man
that there is no such thing as an eternal, invariant "huxna,n nature."
With due regard for what can be considered biotic constants, the character of man is the product of the social order in which he is born, in
which he grows up, and the air of which he inhales throughout his life;
it is its result and indeed one of its most significant aspects. Yet it is
of the utmost importance to understand that what is meant by "social
orders' in Marxian theory is at most only a distant cousin of the notion
of "society" as employed in socio-psychologism. The latter, it will be
recalled, refers to ccenvironment," to c'inter-personal relations," and to
similar aspects of what constitutes the surface of social existence. The
former, on the other hand, encompasses the attained stage of the development of productive forces, the mode and relations of production,
the form of social domination prevailing at any given time, all together
constituting the basic structure of the existing social organization.
Changes of the social order (in the Marxian understanding of that

term), radical and shattering as they always ate, have taken centuries
to matun h d have oecured only a few times in the course of history.
Chmqmndhg1y, chmges changes the nature of man have also p l r d
at a g l d pace; while assuming tremendous proportions-if looked at
in fU histotical *perspective,they have bem all but imperceptible in
the lifespan, of entire generations. Still it is a fallacy to mistake the
sl-ess
of change in the character of man for its abeeace. This error
leads to psychologism and to the belief in the everlasting -en=
of
the human species. And it is no less fallacious to deduce from the
existence of change its rapidity* This error in turn leads to socbt
psychdogism and to the illusion that human beings can be "remodeled" by parsuasion or by some repair jobs within the existing Bocial
order, that they can be manipulated into something c l i f f a t from
wbat that social order has made them*
Thus a proper analysis of human motivations and conduct must
refer to a timespan shorter than that of psychologism but longer than
that of socio-psychologism. It has to avoid the a-historical frozenness
of the former while escaping at the same time the newspaper-headline
orientation of the latter. And it must consider human development in
its tme context: the economic and social order determining the content and molding the profile of the relevant historical epoch. Accordingly the exploration of the human character can neither rely on empty
abstractions such as "man in general" w r gain much insight from an
emr~soawefdexambation of spurious coslc~etessuch as the "otherh t e d personality," the "tradeunion man; the "chamber of camm a e man? OF the "&in the gray flannel suit." At the present
tkns d in this country, the object of the investigation is the human
being born with certain inhesited dmmcteristks and reared as a manba of a class in capitabt d t y a + m o r e $pecifically+h capitalist
society's most advanced stage, the reign of manopo1y capital. .
This suggests that-leaving biology aside--the first step of such
an investigation has to be-dhcted toward the understanding of the
basic factors determkhg human adsterne under the prevaXng social
order. Outstanding among these factors is the vast expansion of society's productive resources. Based on a spectacular intenfication of
the subjugation of natun (including human nature) by society, this
growth of pductivity has promoted (and has beem promoted by). a'
en do us increase of rationality in the productive process as well
as in the mental habits of men.Yet it is inherent in the capitalist ordu,
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and indeed its most striking characteristic, that this advance in rationality has proceeded in a complex and contradictory fashion. I t has
been primarily an advance of partid rationality and has remained esamtially confiied to segments of the social fabric, to its particular units
and aspects, Thus the efficiency of industrial and agricultural enterprises, the rationality of their administration, of their cost and price
and profit d c u l a t i o q as well as of their efforts to manipulate the
market, have reached unprecedented dimensions. But this increase in
partial rationality has not been accompanied by a co~~esponding
growth of total rationality, of rationality in the overall organization
and functioning of society. In fact, the total rationality of the soda
order has declined; the disparity between partial and total rationality
has been growing increasingly pronounced. This can be fully r e a l i d
if one thinks of the contrast between the automated, electronid1y controlled factory and the economy as a whole with its millions of unemplayed and other millions of uselessly employed people; if one considers the efficiency with which redundant chrome and fins are being
affied to unfunctional automobiles; or if one contemplates the palatial office towers, planned and equipped according to the last word of
science, in which highly skilled employees devise the m a t effative
methods for the promotion of a new map, standing next to squalid
slums in which families of five vegetate in one dilapidated filthy room.
But the abyss dividing the parts from the whole is most horrifying if
one places next to each other the breathtaking productive power harnessed in the energy of the atom, and the death, the misery, the human
degradation, that mark the existence of the great majority of mankind
subsisting in the underdeveloped countries.
The basic reascm for thk glaring cleavage between partial and
total rationality, between the rising "know how," and the declining
"know what," is the alienation of man from his means of production,
an alienation that has become increasingly marked throughout.the
history of capitalism and is strongly accentuated in its current monopolistic phase. Indeed the concentration of the means of production
in the hands of a small group of o ~ r e s p o n s i b l to
e no one but
themselves and to their everlasting commitment to keep increasing
their profibwho smoothly and rationally preside over their corporate empires, has completed the fixation of the productive apparatus as
a power outside and above the individd, a power dominating his
existence but m M y inaccessible to his control. And at no time in
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history has this power over the vast and growing productive forces
been to such an extent power over life and death of millions.of men,
women, and children everywhere.
But the most insidious, and at the same time the most portentous,
aspect of this overwhelming power of the objectified productive relations over the life of the individual is their capacity to determine decisively his psychic structure. For the conflict between total and partial
rationality not only sets the tone of the entire capitalist culture; it also
sinks deeply into the mentality of the human being brought up in and
molded by the all-pervasive institutions, values, and habits of thought
which make up that culture. The exigencies of the productive process
call for the development of an increasingly well trained, literate, and
intelligent manpower. Earning a livelihood at the conveyer belt, in the
office, or in the sales force of the modern corporation depends on the
possession of rational attitudes and aptitudes greatly superior to what
was required at an earlier, less advanced stage of capitalist development. Much of the work that used to be guided by authority, tradition, and intuition is now based on scientifically established procedures
and accurate measurements. Yet, as stressed above, this highly rationalized effort is directed towards largely irrational ends; the individual worker is not only unconcerned with the outcome of the
productive process in which he plays an infinitesimal part but this outcome has no meaning and no purpose; it cannot inform his activity
with the knowledge of aim or with the pride of accomplishment.
This incessantly reproduced clash between what might be called
ccmicro-sense" and c'rnacro-madness" is, however, only one part of
the story. The other, even more important, aspect is the profound
impact of the lack of total rationality upon the dynamics and nature
of partial rationality itself. I must therefore amend what I said above
about the achievements in regard to partial rationality. For reason is
indivisible, and the irrationality of the whole cannot coexist harmoniously with the rationality of the parts. The one continually threatens
the other, and their antagonism expresses one of the profound contradictions of the capitalist system. Whereas the irrationality of the
whole must be constantly maintained if exploitation, waste, and privilege, if-in one word-capitalism is to survive, the rationality of society's individual parts is enforced by the drive for profits and the
competitive necessities of capitalist enterprise* Thus this partial rationality contintially edges forward-albeit jerkily and unevenly-but
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the advance takes place at the cost of its being warped, perverted, and
corrupted by the irrationality of the surrounding social order. As a result, such progress as has been attained is far from uniform. Some of
it constitutes genuine step forward in the rational comprehension of
the world and in the development of the forces of production. This
applies to much of what has been accomplished in such areas as
mathematics and natural scienca9 as well as in certain branches of
historical research. Elsewhere, however, what parades as an increase
in rationality is frequently nothing but the amplification and propagation of business "know how," of the rationality of the capitalist market. There the intellectual effort which takes market relations for
granted is exclusive1y directed towards manipulation in the interest
of corporate enterprise. What it promotes is "practical intelligence,"
the capacity to make the best of a given market constellation, to maximize one's advantages in the struggle of all against all. Thus, important
parts of physics and chemistry have been pressed into the service of
war and destruction; much mathematical and statistical ingenuity has
been turned into an auxiliary of monopolistic market control and
profit maximhtion; psychology has become a prostitute of "motivation research" and personnel management; biology is made into a
handmaiden of pharmaceutical rackets; and art, language, color, and
sound have been degraded into instrumentalities of advertising.
Under such circumstances human rationality inevitably becomes
crippled, and its advance is pushed into a direction that bears no relation to the prerequisites for, and the needs of, human health, happiness,
and development. If the compulsion to take anything for granted is
a fetter on the expansion and perfection of men's capacity to reason
and to understand, the oppressive and stifling function of that fetter
grows in proportion to the irrationality of what men are brought up
not to question but to accept as a datum. -True, taking capitdim for
granted when it was an essentially progressive social order interfered
relatively little with (or even promoted) the development af partial
rationality. By the same token, however, the necessity not to scrutinize
but tb treat as part of the natural order of things the regime of monopoky capital, along with all the waste and all the destruction that go
with it, constitutes a straitjacket within which reasan cannot but
suffocate. Thus the clash between partial and total rationality becomes
complicated and aggravated by the no less violent conflict between
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nar~nand the debasement of rtiason which dominates the sphexe of
paatid r a t i d t y itself.
This condition has manifold psychological dcati~ns
to only
two of which I can now attempt to draw your attention. First, such
rationality as prevails solidifies itself into a system of rules, procedures,
and habits of thought that not only does not fiuther the satisfaction of
human needs but becomes a formidable obstacle to human develop
ment and, indeed, survival. As bougeois rationality tums increasingly
into the rationality of domination, exploitation, anand war, the ordinary
man revoIts against this obstruction to his aspirations for peace, happiness, and freedom. Yet, afflicted with ''common sense" that is studiously nurtured by all the agencies of bourgeois culture and the paincipal injunction of which is to take capitalist rationality for granted,
he can hardly avoid identifying the rationality of buying, d h g , and
profit-with reason itself. His revolt against capitalist rationality, against the rationality of markets and profits, thus becomes a revolt against reason itself, turns into anti-intellectmhn, and promotes
aggmssiveness toward those who manage to capitahe on the rules of
the capita&t game to thdr advantage and advancement. It renders
him an easy prey of irrationality..
Irrationality and aggressiveness in our time are, theref*
not
mnamtiong of some unalterable human instincts. Nor do they express
simply the.suppusedly "natural" rejection of reasoa. Irrationality and
aggressiveness in our .time reflect primarily the refusal to accept as
saamanct the rationality of capitalism. They testify to the protest
against the mutilation and degradation of nason for the sake of capitalist domination. This outcry against bourgeois rationality, as well
as its idenEificaticm with reason as ~u4
is magdfkntly depicted~in
Dostoev&y's Undeqround Man who 'tomits up reason" and who
scornfuIly mijets the commandment to accept the proP0s;h that
two times two equals four. While this strikingly exemplifies the posture
of irrationalism, an important aspect ob the Underground Man's attitude should not be lost sight of. It is that the Underground Man, irrational and ''cnaf as he is, is actudy profoundly right in ' ' v d t i q
up muon,'' in i n i g to bow to the logic of two times two q d
four. For this logic is the logic of the capitalkt market, of the arploitation of man by man, of privileges, insecurity, and war. To be sure,
contempt for this r a t i d t y , his uprising against the ~coanmonsense9'
of human misery, is an irrational reaction to a pernicious social order.
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But it is the only reaction available to the isolated and helples~indiiridud who, incapable of comprehending the foby which he ib
b g crushed, is unable to struggle effectively against them. Thir
r e a h is neurosis.
Secondly, as I mentioned in passing earlier, the development of
the forces of production and the advance of rationality with which it
has been associated were based on a tremendous iatdication of
human domination over nature. The result of this harnessing of
natural resources to the needs of men has been a makentous rise in
the output of goods; services, health, and literacy--combined with a
spectacular lightening of the burden of human toil. Yet this advance.
was achieved not merely by the expansion of human control over the
objects and energies of the outside world; it was based on a perhaps
even more radical subjugation of the nature of man himself. This subjugation has two separate, if closely interconnected, aspects. In the precapitalist era, it involved the emergence and development of the
domination and exploitation of man by man. Extracting horn the
underlying population varying quantities of economic surplus, the
dominating and exploiting classes used this economic surplus to auiun
their privileged positions in saciety, at the same time directing larger
or smaller shares of the surplus to investment in productive f d t i e s
or to the maintenance of military, religious, and cultural establishments. Applied to thae days, however, the expression "surplus" is a
e~phemism.With productivity and output rising only vny slowly, the
condition had not yet been attained in which the consumption of the
ruling class and its outlays on productive investment and an I~@XNI
and military and other purposes could be bared upon a genuine sufficiency of goods and services for the people. Sheer violence and elaborate systems of political enforcement always played a major mle in
the process of extraction of the requisite resource^. Yet neither would
havesbeen able to fulfill this task had it not been for the development
and propagation of reIigious, legal, moral-in one word: ideological- notions which sanctified the ruling classes' claims to their appropriations and which were turned in the course of centuries into a compreh d v e network of internaked thoughts, beliefs, fears, and hopes,
compelling the people to recognize the rights and to heed the demands
of their rulers.
A new chapter was opened by the advent of the c
a order.~
Naw the human Wig had to go through a further ~ C ~ ofS "adjustS

.
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megt." -Tothe qualities .cultivated inthe wood-hewem and waterd q s 4,
DM-bad to be added a. new and all-bprtaat r c ~ t ~ t
wgf ~ikmdiitpFor
. now it waq no longer sufficient torbe an OM
- ent and selfless serf of a cruel and rapacious squire; what was required
henceforth was a diligent, docile, efficient, and reliable worker in a
rati&dized, .str-hed,
profit-maximizing capitalist enterprise. This
enforced what is '.probably'one of the most far-reaching transfonna-.
tions of "human nature" experienced th* far. If' in the course of preceding history man had been made submissive by exploitation and
domination, the working principles of the capitalist order demanded
that he should acquire the abilify to calculate and the habit of acting
. With forethought and ;te~berBtion:What was left of his elemental
emotionality,
. .
of his spont&neity,'afier having been disciplined for centuries by the, whip of his, titled overlords, came now under the much
m&e systematib, much &re chPreheniive pressure of the callously
and accurately calculating market.
As deliberateness in the business of earning a living-and in
all other aspects of life as well-became the prerequisite for survival
in eapitalist society, spontaneity came to be disdained and feared not
only as a source of disruption of the pduction routine but as a threat
to the stability of the class-domigated , a d exploitative social order.
F r m @e very beginning of the capitalist era it was accordingly exp w d .m,
a:withering fi.e of economic sanctions and eocial opprobrium,
aad the:a$sault against it. was mounted simultaneously by the entire
appmatzr~of bourgepk ideology and d t u r e , including such divergent
wmponmts aar C h & h religion and the utilitarian philosophy. And
in a p i W s current, m,o;nopobtic, phase this attack has multiplied
in scope and int-sity. Just as,human relitions in corporate empires
came by necessity to be attuned to 'c&g
friend$ and influencing
people," so has love been " s t p d e d " into a scientif.ically a p p d
means of securing medically indicated sexual gratification, while.
beauty is idenad with the precise measurements of Miss America,
a d nature, music2.literatureDand art are valued in exact proportion
to the& serving as.purveyws of c c ~ ~ t i ~Not
n . that
" the campaign
against spontaneity was ever decided upan or directed by some executie committee of capitalist ~lders,although-attributing to Marxism
such a view of the matter has long been the stock in trade of prof-s i o d Ma=-refuters whose ignorance of Marxism is exceeded only by
their --pity
& understand
..
it. The implacable hostility toward
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spontaneity and the powerful tendency toward its suppression are
rather the inherent characteristics of a mode of production based on
commodity exchange and unfolding within a system of relations of
pduction of domination and exploitation. Far from #being a premeditated, well-planned stratagem of the ruling class, calculated to
repress the drives and aspirations of the underlying population, both
the ascent of deliberateness and the decay of spontaneity affected the
members of the ruling class itself and turned them in the course of
time into unhappy beneficiaries of an unhappy society.
The crux of the matter, it seems to me, is that market-oriented
deliberateness and market-induced suppression of spontaneity, "adjusting" the privileged and the underprivileged alike to the requirements of the capitalist system, fatally damage what Freud, and before
him Marx and Engels, identified as the sources of human happiness:
freedom of individual development and the capacity to experience
sensual gratifications. Putting a severe tabu on the individual's emotionality and channeling what is left of it into an aggressiveness which
k disciplined and directed toward the attainment of success and the
elimination of rivals in the competitive struggle, they produce "affectcripp1edness"-to use an expression of Freud-and generate the phenomenon which was put into its proper theoretical context by Manr
in his concept of the alienation of man from +If.
This alienation
of man from himself-the maiming of the individual, the subjugation
of his nature to the needs of capitalist enterprise, the mortal wounding
of his spontaneity, and the molding of his personality into a self-seeking,
deliberate, calculating, and circumspect participant in (and object of)
the capitalist process-represents the basic framework within which
the psychic. condition of men evolves in capitalist society.
It is only within this framework that I can see a promise of a
genuine understanding of psychic disturbances in our time. As I mentioned earlier, achieving such an understanding was not given to psychoanalysis. To be sure, Freud's identification of sexual malfunctioning as the principal source of psychic disorder represented a major
advance in psychological thought. But what Freud's theoretical structure fails to provideall assurances and appearances to the contrary
notwithstanding-is a satisfactory explanation of the sexual malfunctioning itself. Not that Freud was unaware of this weakness of his
doctrine, but it was in attempting to fill this crucially important gap
that his efforts were least successful. It was here that he sought to find

ei&w i n pychologinn or in d o - ~ c h o l 6th~~~.
~ : in a
concept of 'a b i W y unchanging human nature with equally lia-:
&anping intra-family relations as symbdhd in the ancient-O d p u s ~
legend; or in d a c e observations ref*
to habits of child rearing
and of sexual edighment. Neither of these a p p r d e s en&led him
to solve the central issue confronting py&ology at the present time:
the specification-ofthe part played by more or4eso invariant
fa~torsin the d e w a t i o n of the psychic structure-of men,
analysis of the profound impact upon the human-.psycheam
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capitalinn.
M e , i m p d by the momentous accomplishments of Pavm.2
l w and his school, have focused attention on tbeformer aspsct of the
matter and have tended--paradoxically enough--to sidestep MPnrb'
mwoiutionary contribution to psychology: the d l a g y of the psyche.
Still, while there can.be no dispute about the importance of-phyd01
logical factors in governing human behavior, it -is indispensable 'to
recognize the vast atent to which the 8 c o d and social urdea.of
ca$ta&m and the process of alienation which it generates mdd the
pph.ic and, indeed, the physical functioning of men in the capitalkt
en. For it is impassible to undemand seaad rnaJfunctioning apart.
from .the- capitdim-caumd atrophy of spontaneity; it is impossibIeCtom
USLderstand the shridcbg capacity to experience sensual' gratifications:
of any kind apart from the capitdim-genesated pmliferation &.delibmateness, s e l f l l q and ~ v ~ e s I sw . d go further and s*
that it 'is impmsib1e to comprehmd human -activity in w . d e c t y arapt as *an-outcapneof a dialectic interaaiaa of biotic forms a d the
working principles of monopoly capitalism, with the latter domha*g,-:
subjugating, and directing the former. And it i s crucially important to
recognize the nature of this interaction of the detqmnimnts -of hum=
d e n c e under capitalimn9because it is the powerful dynamism ab &,
racial and economic d m which points to the 1ocatioa of the strategic.
levclrage which in
of time will shift the histmkd gears a d :
orient the devdopmmt .of man towatds a fuller mahation*of ht
physical, emotional, and r a t i d cap.citir $Thisleverage is to he
found neither in tranqdikg pills nor in "social adjustments," nor+in
the preachi~gof love, of productivity, and of.smeeting of minds." This
leverage must be found in the eetabmeat of a more dad; mom+
human:society, and convendy ti the abditioa of a social OM& basedq
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MARXISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

upon the domination and exploitation of man by man. Not that socialism would change the situation "overnight." Expecting the liquidation
of the centuries-old legacy of capitalism within a relatively short-if
ever so eventful-period of d t i o n reflects the attitude of sociopsychologism, which is as fallacious in this case as it is in others. Thus
it is by no means an accident that those who hold the views of sociopsychologism are among the severest critics of thie existing socialist
societies: censuring sharply the Soviet Union or even China for not
having yet abolished the alienation of man, and for not having yet
created the socialist individual. It hardly needs stressing that demanding such impossible changes amounts to demanding no changes at all;
that stipulating the immediate realization of what can develop only
slowly on the basis of vast institutional transformations as a condition
for the participation in the struggle for a better society is tantamount
to deserting this struggle altogether.
A few concluding remarks: what I have said so far is not meant
to suggest that there may be no possibility of individuals who are ill
finding a measure of relief through currently available means of psychiatric treatment. The frequently reiterated observation that the
degree of success attained in psychotherapy is largely independent of
the school of psychological thought to which the therapist adheres, but
k rather determined by the skill and personality of the physician and
the amount of attention given by him to the patient, suggests the
absence of any well-founded theory underlying*psychotherapeutic p~actice. Moreover, psychotherapy's relative success in dealing with isolated
symptoms of nervous disorder and the generally admitted failure of its
efforts at curing character neurosis would tend to c o n f h the earlier
expressed view that the phenomena underlying character neurosis are
inaccessible to treatment on the individd plane. Indeed, the insistence on the possibility of altering character structure on the individual
plane, of "producing" a healthy, well-functioning, and happy individual in our society is in itself an ideology. It tears asunder individual
and society, it ignores the alienation of man under capitalism, and it
represents a capitulation to socio-psychologism. It obscures the painful
but ineluctable truth that the limits to the cure of man's soul are set
by the illness of the society in which he lives.

BEYOND PSYCHOLOGY
BY ARON KRICH

Paul A. Baran's paper "Mandsm and Psychoanalysis" calls
attention again to the danger of a jealously guarded and partisan
monism. Faced with the formidable task of synthesizing two seminal
conceptuaEzatbns of man -in society, Professor Baran atomizes
psychoanalysis by extrapolating a theory of personality out of a
theory of history. The result, of course, is not synthesis but an ideologicid fantasy in which depth psychology (my italics) is held to
concern itself with "what constitutes the surface of social existencey'
(Baran's italics), and in which abstractions like "the attained ,stage
of the development of productive forces" are held to be of more
concrete influence on the individual than mother love. Corollary
contradictions,arise in embracing those theories of psychoanalysis least
reconcilable with Marxism while castigating its complementary aspects.
This last point best illustrates Baran's need to deny those developments in contemporq psychology and psychoanalysis which
threaten b.imposed "hegemony" of Marxism.Readers will r ~ a lthat
l
Baran, in renouncing "socio-psychologism" as amelioristic, suggests.
that "only Marxism is able to fulfil the.,taskwof "taking up Freud's
work where Freud left it." Baran then goes on to say that it is
"fundamental to the Marxian approach to the study of man that
there is no such thing as an eternal, hv&t
human nature." But .
Freud never abandoned his belief that the infant comes into the
world with an archaic phylogenetic inheritance which is active in its
mental life. These built-in memory traces, Freud held, gave impetus,
for example, to fears of castration as punishment for incest wishes.
It follows that for Freud "the fate of the Oedipus Complex'L,
is the crucial determinant of personality in any society, no matter how
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advanced or primitive. This has remained a basic, if sometimes
hidden, postulate of the orthodox Freudian school. Its rejection
accounts, along with other differences too technical to outline here,
for the rise of the so-called culturalist school of psychoanalysis, which
Baran refers to as "socio-psychologism" and which believes-along
with Baran-that "man is the product of the social order in which
he is born." Yet it is just at this point in his paper that Baran decries
their interest in society as referring "to environment, to inter-personal
relations, and to similar aspects of what constitutes the surface of
social existence."
Baran achieves these stunning reversals by a device which is
not immediately apparent in the text of a persuasive polemic. As I
read it, I found myself puzzled at being in disagreement even while
wanting to agree, until I realized that he was writing about a psychoanalysis stripped of function. The work of metapsychology is taken
over by a "metamarxism." Nowhere in the paper is there a recognition
of psychoanalysis as an instrument for the exploration of the inner
processes of human personality. By the same token there is utter disregard, or ignorance, of its clinical observations.
How else could we explain Baran's dismissal of the need for love
as "liberal claptrap." The most convincing kind of evidence (Spitz,
Goldfarb, Roudenlio, Bowlby and others) is now available that the
absence of mothering care in the first year of life can lead to crippling disabilities of personality, ranging from psychopathic inability
to give and receive love to mute autism. More recently these findings have been confirmed in the controlled laboratory setting by
Harlow's now famous, ingenious substitution of wire and terry-cloth
"mothers" for the real mothers of infant rhesus monkeys. Baran
either is--or pretends to b m b l i v i o u s of that part of human motivation which is elaborated below the level of awareness in the constellation of nurture and nature.
By eliminating the psychic backdrop against which human events
are enacted, Baran leaves himself without a set of variables intervening between the individual and his social order. Since, according to
Baran, the important influences on human beings do not stem from
"environment" (i.e., the encounters from birth through maturity with
parents, peers, and other significant people who transmit and interpret
the social order) but from the social order itself, (i.e., "the attained
stage of the development of productive forces, the mode and relations of production, the form of social domination prevailing") the re-
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action of the individual becomes undifferentiated. N e d , in Baran's
sense of the word, identifies something endemic to the sick society
and, in the analogue of physical diseare, the individual unavoidably
"cat&es" it as from a non-filterable virus.
Indeed, in his spoken remarks Baran declared: "NeurosiS is
society." Strangely enough this position, if modified to read, ''Change
society and man's difficulties in living will change," is central to much
of contemporary psychoanalytic thought. Erich Fromm and Karen
Homey, in particular, have alerted us to the pibilities of a double
neurosis in which the pressures of cultural history herniate into the
vicissitudes of personal history. The position that man is a product
of his culture as much as his culture is a product of man is the basis
for those occasional recommendations for new ways in c h i l d - d g ,
education, and other human relations emanating from the movement of "socio-psychologism" which Baran considers so pwillanimous.
Obviously some of us are more immune than others from infection by our sick society. There is a growing body of studies on the
epidemiology of mental illness which may ultimately reveal a nosological pattern of mental disorder by economic class, occupation,
education, or other reality circumstances. However, all of us live
under monopoly capitalism; but only about 15 percent of us break
down under its pressure or are seized with its "macro-madness". The
rest of us hang an to our culture's "mic~sense." We handle the
stress of life in a variety of ways with varying degrees of success or
failure. The methods we choose to use come up for examination in the
psyclboanalytic therapies. From these we learn that the adult who is
having neurotic .difficulties in living i s usually suffering from an
inability to let go of beliefa about b l f and his world which were
early imprinted and are no longer appropriate. Such an individual
is not in the grip of "the form of social domination prevailing" but
is, rather, in the toils of what Freud once called his "reminiscencess"
of what happened in his past.
To see the operational inutility of Baran's reductionism we need
only look at actual clinical situations. "It is impoesiblq'' Baran
writes, "to understand sexual malfunctioning apart from capitalismcaused atrophy of spontaneity." Parenthetically, one might ask Baran
to document his assumption that sexual malfunctioning has increased
in tbe advanced stage of monopoly capitalism over, let us say, late
19-century burgeoning industrialism From the sparse evidence
available it seems more likely that at least one half of the population
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in the countries of greatest industrial development are enjoying greater
sexual participation and response than ever before. But, again, Baran's
reductionism leaves no leeway for the consideration of such variables
as the accelerating emancipation of women.
Leaving this question aside, we could reply to Baran that it is
quits possible to u n d d and treat sexual malfunctioning without reference to "capidkrn-caused atrophy of spontaneity." Any
clinician could supply numenus instances of the removal of debilitating symptoms and disturbances in the sex-life without such reference. At the risk of sounding gauche in this non-clinical publication,
I must say that understanding a patient's masturbation fantasies may
be nion pertinent. In the area of ' sexual behavior, Marxism has
rather. remote heuristic value when compared to the methodology
of psychoanalysi.
However, if Baran intends his sweeping statement to mean that
behavioral science must be broad enough to include all the data which
might help us to understand the individual, then he is doing contemporary psychoanalysis an injustice. On the whole, loday's therapists are alert to the multiple vectors that locate the individual in his
social field. As a corrective to Baran's caricature of psychology as the
"prostitute of motivation research," I offer a randomly chosen
sample of a psychoanalytic view of the "economic" factors in neurosis.
From a recently published statement by a spokesman for the Karen
Horney group we hear:
As originally pointed out, in spite of individual variations, the
crucial conflicts around which neuroses develop are almost always
the same. I t is economically based in our culture on the principle
of individual competition which generates hostilities and fears.
Success means economic security and enhanced prestige; failure,
less income and diminished self-esteem. With the resultant
emotional isolation, the need for love becomes all the more intense
and is overvalued in our culture. This-not genuine love, but an
illusion of it-will solve all problems. Just as there are contradictory drives in neurosis, there. are false values in our culture
which intensify the neurotics' problems. We put value on competition and success with which antithetical values of brotherly
love and humility collide. Simultaneously, desires for more are
stimulated through our advertising, while circumstances constantly frustrate them. We are told we are free individuals, although'
realistically there are many factual limitations to getting what
one Hmnts even if one is energetic and efficient. (Kellman,
Arneriean Handbook of Psychiatry, p. 1437.)
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is immutable. If human nature is immutable then changes in environment are futile.
Professor Baran attempts to escape this dilemma by positing a
"sociology of the psyche". This means, I suppose, that individual
psychology is held indeterminate between epochal social changes like
that of feudalism to capitalism a ~ d ,again, in the projected leap
from capitalism to socia1ism. What happens to human motivation in
the interval is rejected as spuriously concrete and ahistorical "sociopsychologism". In this paradigm of wishful thinking, psychology is
by-passed and with it the possibility for genuine understanding of
how the nature of man changes while he changes his society.

THE CONFLICT W I T H I N
PSYCHOANALYSIS
BY N. S . LEHRMAN, M.-D.

Professor Baran's distinguished p a p on "Marxisrn and Psy&oanalysis'' in the O c t k issue of MONTHLY
REVIEW,is a wklcome
advance in Mamist thinking. It points out the fundamental difference
in approach between Freud and Marx, rather than prating about nonexistent differences between Freud and Pavlov. The basic truth which
Baran points out moat clearly once again is the fundamental fact that
M d s sociological explanations of psychology are far more accurate
and far more useful than Freud's biopsychological explanations of
sociology.
Having made this point, however, Baran does not dip and throw
the Freudian baby out with the bathwater. H e reco&&s the importance, as many Marxists have not, of separating that which is true
and useful in Freud's work from its mystical, unscientific core. To
follow Baran still further, I think we must do with Freud what Marx
did with the mystical Hegel: not discard him but, in a sense, stand
him on his feet. I believe this task is in process of being accomplished.
The key to this problem, as I see it, is the scientific recognition and
undentanding of the importance of human feelings as signals. Pavlovian~have recognized the importance of verbal signah, but have
tended to m k h i z e the significance
of emotions. Freudians, correctly
recognizing the importance of human feelings, have incorrectly seen
them as determined ultimately by inner biological reality rather than
by outer social reality. A correct synthesis of the two points of view
is by no means impossible.
Three Specific Criticisms

There are three aspects of Baran's paper, however, to which I
beliwe valid exception can be taken.
is
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(1) While I think he is correct in criticizing 'csocio-psychologism", it seems to me that he does not sufficiently recognize the
correct direction this movement has taken, even though it has as yet
not gone far enough. To present "socio-psychologism" solely as a
"concession" is incorrect1y to imply that there is a mastermind within
the field of psychoandysis from whom scientific advance is reluctantly extracted. I do not think there is any such mastermind,
although perhaps some psychoanalyst members of the Guild of
Catholic Psychiatrists might like to take on this function.
Because "mental health" has so far been presented only in terms
of family and other soupy "togetherness" does not mean that the
concept can go no further. True mental health can only be achieved
under socialism, in which man's exploitation of man, and man's
consequent inhumanity to man, have been ended.
(2) Baran's discussion of man's "alienation from himself' also
has a rather vague and fuzzy flavor. I am not quite sure what he
means-and this is unusual in so precise and meticulous a thinker
as Baran. Perhaps he is referring to the ever-widening gap between
the actual achievements of the individuals in our society and their
ever-increasing potentials. If so, greater precision in his paper might
have been in order.
(3) Baran seems to overstress the importance of spontaneity and
emotionality in his basically correct criticism of the "men of measured
merriment" of our times. This overstress can lead to a worship of
impulse and feelings, at the expense of thought and consciousness.
Freudians have attempted, in the most unscientific way possible, to
separate thinking from feeling, and it is a little surprising to find
Baran apparently tending to do the same. Thought and feeling are
two aspects of the same process Sir Charles Sherrington, the brilliant
British Nobel laureate in neurophysiology, pointed out long ago that
"every cognition has, potentially at least, an emotive value." This
inextricability of thinking and feeling is most clearly described in
V. J. McGill's fine little book, Emotions and Reason.
W h a t Psychoanalysis Can Do

Unlike Baran, I write as a professional in the field of psychoanalysis. In my opinion, psychoanalysis is one of the most potent
tools that have existed in the medico-ideological armamentarium.
Provided that a person's basic economic needs are met-and
they
usually are in the people who can afford the treatment-psycho-
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analysis can often truly throw open the door of happiness and usefulness to suffering people. It can do so by giving them a clearer understanding of themselves in relationship to the world about them-to
their families and to their society--by helping them to understand
and to change their own incorrect responses. It cam do so by helping
people to understand their own feelings, the signals to their consciousness arising from their present and past experience, and by
aiding them to understand the extent to which these feeling-signals
are accurate, and to what extent they are not.
I have seen desperate, panicked people returned to usefulness,
health, and courage through psychoanalytic treatment. I have seen
disintegrating families, filled with acrimony, restored to warmth,
happiness, and effectiveness through psychoanalytic treatment. I
have seen cowardly people become courageous, and terrified people
become calm, again through psychoanalytic treatment. Properly applied, by a courageous psychoanalyst with an accurate perception of
the world in which he lives, psychoanalysis can, even at this moment,
after certain important technical changes, be a most mighty boon
to many of the suffering Americans who can afford it.
The effectiveness of psychoanalysis is, however, limited by the
society within whidh it exists. The extent to which any person can be
helped cannot, in the long run, extend beyond limits set by the
contradictions and opportunities of the society he lives in. But, on the
basis-of what I have seen, I firmly believe that psychoanalysis can
help people to see reality more clearly, so that they can help to
*mprove the world, and even to enjoy it in the process.
--
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What Psychoarialysis Has Done
The potentialities of psychoanalysis for assisting human advancement are tremendous. So are the potentialities of nuclear energy. In
both cases, I am referring to what might be done with the valuable
ideas, techniques, and ideology, after elimination of the anti-human
and unscientific elements.
But the overall result of psychoanalysis, like - that of nuclear
energy, has been basically anti-human so far, it seems to me. It has
had a profoundly destructive effect on human thinking, despite the
assistance it has undoubtedly rendered to many individuals. Psychoanalysis is potent. It is potent in helping people to feel and function
better, but it is also potent in making people worse.
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The harmful therapeutic effect which psychoanalysis often has
is frequently hidden by analysts' tendencies to blame the patient if
he is more disturbed after treatment than before. "He must have been
schizophrenic," they say, making a mystical, Kantian Ding an sich
of this vague "disease."
But if psychoanalysts take credit for helping some of their
patients, and they rightfully do, they must also take blame for harming others. In my own practice, for example, I find that the most
difficult patients to treat are those who have failed with other
therapists. In these situations, it is harder to undo the harm which
the previous treatment has caused than it is to treat people who
have not had the dubious benefits of such unsuccessful treatment.
Many private psychiatric hospitals have large numbers of patients
who became worse in office psychoanalytic, or psychoanalytically
oriented, treatment. The state hospitals know full well the glib
excuses for uselessness and irrational behavior presented on admission
by "graduates" of some of the psychoanalytically-oriented hospitals.
These people are worse after treatment than before, so we must
conclude the treatment harmed them.
The Pernicious Social and Political Effects of Psychoanalysis

From the social and political point of view, the overall results
of psychoanalysis have been far more pernicious, I believe, than
even Baran realizes. As often practiced, psychoanalysis is the most
potent method yet devised for paralyzing the radical intellectual, and
the Jewish radical in particular. Tensions, particularly of a racist
kind, fill the air of our country, and vague, covert threats impinge
on people these days, particularly when they begin to become politically active. The result is fear and anxiety.
There remains little political organization to provide solidarity
and emotional support for such individuals. Indeed, many Left
organizations seem so frightened that they tend to extrude the member who becomes uneasy. When in trouble, people no longer go to
the rabbis and ministers for help and courage. Failing to realize that
they are responding to the stimuli of a pervasively contradictory and
threatening society, they consider themselves "disturbed" and seek
psychoanalytic, or psychotherapeutic, help.
The analyst, "high in a tower up a chamber to the east," doubts
the existence of harassment in the present, suspects the patient's
reaction is "paranoid" and assumes that the roots of the fears of the
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Search versus Dogma in Psychoanalysis

Within psychoanalysis3as in all other parts of ideology, a struggle
is going on between scientific search and mystical dogma. Within the
field itself, even today, increasing numbers of psychoanalysts are
rejecting the biopsychological dogma of Freud. It does not work.
Instead, they are searching out new and useful truths in the nature
of the society.
While, as Baran points out, these psychologico-social trends still
fall short of the truth, they do represent movement in a progressive
direction within the field. They indicate a change toward increased
recognition of the still basically unrecognized primacy of societal
factors in molding our biological clay. It depends on Marxists, in the
field and outside it, to point out that the essential "societal factor"
which must be seen and changed is the existence of class 'contradictions within our society, contradictions which can be resolved only,
so far as I am concerned, by a peaceful transfer of power from the
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"elite" to. the people, -through extmuicm .of Arnedanocracy into the economic field as well.
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Search versus Dogma in Marxism

The struggle between search and dogma is not limited to psychoanalysis, however. It exists in the field of Marxism as well. Many
prewiously accepted concepts may require corntion and wen-to
use a dirty word-"revision."
Science, after all, revises its conceptualizations when formerly useful ideas become a drag; isn't M m ism also a scie31..ce?
One important area where Marxist binking might warrant re
examination i s its tendency to damn the entire bourgeoisie. Psychoanalysis, an important ideology of the bourgeoisie, reflects both its
healthy and unhealthy trends. There is a tradition of political and
scientific democracy deeply rooted in both the American bourgeoisie
and American psychoanalysis. It was this democratic tradition in the
bourgeoisis itself which drove back McCarthy, despite the sig-nal
absence of effective help from labor or the Left.
A fundamental conflict exists within the ideology of the American
bourgeoisie. On the one hand, there is the tradition of freedom of
peaceful dissent, which partly underlies America's previously unmatched technological progress, and from which emerged John
Dewey's pragmatic philosophy. On the other hand, the& is the fact '
of oligarchic economic control, with its ideological derivations of
"elitism" and obscurantism. This conflict exists in the minds of wexy
bourgeois, even those named Rockefeller and Stevenson.
Since there are such constructive, honest, democratic trends within
bourgeois ideology, it appears that it might be worth while to work
openly and honestly with the bourgeoisie. Such honest intellectual
interaction is far more desirable than renouncing the constructive
influence we can have on the bourgeoisie, and leaving the ideological
field to Roman Catholic dogma and elite fascism.
Search versus Dogma in Religion

The struggle between scientific search and mysterious dogma
exists in the much neglected and oft-maligned field of religion as
well. The mainstreams of American Protestantism and Judaism
today emphasize search-the search of each man for his own God,
the attempt of each individual to realize his own potentialities. The
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monolithic Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, resembles
much of the contemporary American psychoanalysis, insofar as both
emphasize submission to dogma. The former kneels while the latter
lies, each passively accepting what is presented as the doctrine of
a great Jew.
Psychoanalysis, the ideology of the bourgeoisie, reflects both
the scientific and dogmatic aspects of the class from which it comes.
It, like the bourgeoisie, should be dealt with openly, peacefully, and
scientifically, so as to retain that which is good and useful, without
keeping the dead and dogmatic. Precision, rather than large
emptiness, is the halhaxk of science. Let us therefore be careful
not to throw the baby out with the bath water-whether the baby
be Freudian or bourgeois.

NEED NOT W A I T .
B Y PETER B .
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Professor Baran hai given his article a misleading title and it
is therefore difficult to discuss it. A careful outline of the theoretical
propositions of both Marxism and psychoanalysis must be the basis
of7anyinvestigation. Only then will it be possible to come to specific
conclusions and to answer the important questions: To what degree
may a science present a true advance but still be misused by present
conditions of the social order? To what degree is it itself a reflection
of these social conditions?
Psychoanalysis would have to be discussed as a theory of the
psychology and psychopathology of man, as a technique of treatment
and as a tool for research. Similarly one would need an outline of
the propositions of a Marxist psychology, or at least to apply con.
sistently the principles of dialectical materialism to the clinical data
in order to evolve such a psychology.
Baran is interested in the "social" aspects of Marxian psychology,
and he refers to psychoanalysis only to the degree that it has reference to social conflicts. But psychic life can be understood only in its
continuous interplay with biologic and social conditions. It is more
than their simple reflection. It follows its own laws and its own
mechanisms. The great achievement of psychoinalysis is based on
Freud's freeing of psychology from the tradition of his time, which
had reduced it to biological laws and to the function of the central
nervous system. There is a similar danger today in the assumption that
by knowing social laws and conflicts one thereby also understands
psychic conflicts.
If Baran had been content to discuss the social frame of reference within which the individual functions, he would have given us
an important outline. But he went far beyond this and thereby, as I
shall try to show, ends up with an anti-psychologic position.
Dr. Neubauer is a meem.ber of the American Psychoanalytic Associa;tion
und Director of the Child Development Center in New York.

P E T E R 8. N E U B A U E R

He doep not refer once to psychic processes, to the developmental
organization, to the symbolic rep-tation
of the outside world, to
the role of memory, of fantasy and thought processeq neither as a
Marxian psychology would present them, nor a9 psych~alysisdoes.
We can easily agree with him when he speaks about the dangem
of viewing man too much from the individual point of view, which
leads to the opposite mistake, namely, to the psychologizing of

Baran has eloquently presented an outline of social conflicts m
a capitahtic society. He stresses the increase of irrationality of our
d order enforced by competition and the drive for profits. This
in turn becomes an obstacle t o human development, leading to an
impairment of the spontaneity in man. Social conflicts have a direct
and immediate bearing in certain areas of our interest: (1) for the
understanding of whatever comprises mental health in the community; (2) for the purpose of prevention of emotional disorders;
and (3) in order to assess the interplay between the social and
neurotic conflict. This is to say, for an understanding of how
individual psychological conflict can be reinforced or even exploited
by social conditions. But this is insufficient to permit us to accept his
definition of neurosis-that
it is the irrational reaction to a
p d c i o u s social order-nor does it explain his finding that imtionality. and aggressiveness in man are a refusal to accept capitalism.
When we explore the causes of, let us say, a phobia, our patients
do not inform us that their central conflict stems from their relationship to social institutions or from their role in connection with the
means of production. We have learned that each step in hu~lan
development is influenced by the human example others give, by the
quality of this relationship. From the study of children we have
learned to raise these questions: What has happened to the child,
by whom, when did it happen in his development, and what are the
specific citlrructeristks of this child? Unless we have the answers to
these four factors in each individual life history, we are not able to
understand a child's psychic life. It is true that the parents are
exposed to social conditions, are influenced by them, and transmit
them to the child. But again, the transmission is not a simple reflection. The parents, too, transform their social experience through their
psychic organization, their degree of understanding or rationality,
their degree of maturity. We are forced to explore each individual's
own life history and we are happy to say that we have such an
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Individual Psychology today. While there is danger of over-emphasizing the individual, there is also the possibility of giving the
individual unlimited attention.
We find that certain specific events and experiences within this
relationship can lead to an arrest of further development, and that
these patients then repeat over and over again their early pattern,
which has become partially independent of changes in their environment. Our patients have lost the freedom to change with changing
circumstances. Even if them should be a vast improvement in the
social order, they would be bound to the old because psychic enslavement does not permit a free interaction between the individual and
his environment.
These important processes take place within the family. The
concept of a psychological environment is significantly not acceptable
to Bsran because it does not stand for society at large. But we need a
concept which refers to that part of society to which an individual
has a significant emotional relationship, namely, his environment. The
role of the family as a bridge between the individual and social
organization is psychologically of utmost importance. When damage
has been done to a child within the family, so that neurotic conflict
has emerged, the stepping out of the child into society will have only
a secondary modifying influence on his further development. The
extra-familial experience may ameliorate or reinforce the original
problem, but we cannot regard it as the direct cause. The family has
the capacity to protect the individual from the pathological influences
of the social order, or the family may be the seat of such disturbances
as to be responsible for much more serious pathology than is generally found in the community.
The capacity to love, to understand, and to reach maturity varies
from individual to individual in each society. We have to emphasize
these differences, for they alone permit us to understand why some of
our patients suffer from phobias and others from depression, why
some from an inhibition of sexual function, others from a perversion,
why some are addicted to alcohol and others to success or to failure
in the same mciety. This is the main interest of psychopathology.
Statements by BaFan that our capitalist society is responsible for
sexual inhibition present a generalization beyond reason. Have these
disturbances not occurred in other societies and isn't it true that
we find not only inhibition but also the opposite-selfish indulgence
with insufficient controls?
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If we are not interested in studying the individual life history,
the phases of psychological development which are particularly
vulnerable to certain influences, the talents of each individual, his
capacity to submit to present conditions or to transcend them, then
we do not have a psychology. It is for this reason that Baran has not
discussed any of the contributions which psychoanalysis has made to
an understanding of these essential variables, and we therefore have
no basis for discussing the correctness of this part of psychoanalytic
theory. Without such an individual psychology, Baran arrives at
the conclusion that "the insistence on the possibility of altering
character structure on the individual plane is in itself an ideology,"
and that "the limits to the cure of man's soul are set by the illness of
the society in which he lives." Such a formulation does not take
into account the contradictions in each social and individual organization, the endless attempt of man to master nature, to change himself, and to substitute rationality for irrationality. As Freud has
stated it, where there is id there shall be ego.
I t is possible to learn about those psychological processes which
arrest development and set off a neurotic repetition of conflict. It
is possible to develop techniques to free the individual from such inner
enslavement. I t is possible to use professional skill and the continuous
effort of one individual to help another individual free himself from
internal and external restrictions.
I t is true, however, that there are psychiatric disorders which are
often less responsive to our intervention. If Baran had been satisfied,
as he said he would be, to outline a sociology of the psyche, he would
have made it easier for us to study his findings with the care which
they deserve, but he drew conclusions which attempt to explain
psychopathology while neglecting psychological processes and neglecting the individual, and therefore he has fallen prey to some errors
he criticizes in others. Even when man shall have mastered society
in such a way that its resources will be sufficient "to give to each
according to his needs," we will still have need of a science of the
individual and his inner life. In the meantime we can do better than
just wait.

TWO RECENT MARXIST VIEWS
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
BY N O R M A N REIDER, M.D.

Soviet Survey, a London quarterly devoted to providing facts
and analyses of the Soviet Union, presents in its issue for JulySeptember, 1959, an account of a special conference called on the
initiative of the Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the
USSR for the purpose of discussing the problems of ideological
struggle with modern Freudianism. The account was written by P. P.
Bundarenko and M. Kh. Rabinovich and originally appeared in
Voprosy Filosofii, February, 1959. According to the editors of Soviet
Survey, this document is of particular interest because it represents
a new line in Soviet psychology and not just the view of an individual
writer. This new line, they say, is much better informed and much
more sophisticated than the official line of ten or even five years ago,
and the conference in question dealt with problems which previously
would have been ignored as wholly irrelevant.
The implication in the title of the conference that there is
something modem about Freudianism is a promising beginning, but
unfortunately the promise is not fulfilled. An introductory speech by
Professor S. A. Smkisov holds that bourgeois countries have accepted
Freud's theory that the basic forces determining human behavior are
unconscious biological instincts originating in the sexual experiences
of infancy. This unfortunate kind of inaccuracy characterizes a great
deal of the document, which deals heavily in criticism of Freudians
who use psychoanalytic methods "to mislead and pacify the workers."
Many of the speeches that follow are clearly not scientific discussions
but polemics against the imputed political implication of Freudianism.
This pattern is sustained by F. V. Basin, who attacks the saciological applications of psychoanalytic theory. What is significant in
this paper is the repeated statement that attempts to reconcile FreudDr. Reider is Senior ChiGf of Psychiatry, Mount Zion Hosfiital, San
Francisco, and an instructor in the San Francisco Psychoanalytical Institute.
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ian and Paviovias theories must be fought. Howeva, a cogent
remark is made in the statement that Freud's error lay not in the
fact that he gave much attention to the problem of conflict,but in
his mneous formulation of the problem. Freud is o b v i d y not
forgiven for having deserted the field of neuropathollogy, since '%e
renounced the study of neurosis as a consequence of disturbance of
the normal 'interrelation of nervous procebsu and adopted ' a ptb
of subjective idealism." Then is a still further yielding in this
critique of Freud in the acknowledgmmt that an impulse behind a
particular action can influence behavior despite its being unwdous.
Even though Bassin states that this hypothesis is given a mystid
interpretation by F&
and that Pavlds explanations are mare
scientific, it is nevertheless a distinct change for the official attitude
to concede even this much in regard to the forces of the u n c d 0 1 ~ .
On the whole, however, it is clear that for the most part the Soviets
still consider psychoIogy scientific d y when it is neurophysiology.
This concession Bassin negates in the rest of his paper. He poses
to Freudians the following question: "How can the Oedipus complex
occur in children fed artificially and not fmm the mothas breast?.'
'What happened to the Oedipus complex in the m a t r i d period,
when children did not know their own fathers?" "What ,+ppens
when children are brought up from infancy in orphanages?" He
stateJ further, u'I?hese simple questions prmnd fatal to the F~eudkm
and to this day they are powerless to answer them, since the facts
refute their attempt to reply from F r e u k podtiom.'' The truth is
that these excellent questions have been considered and investigated
by many psychoandysts. For example, Anna Fmd's aad Dorothy
B w ~ a m 9Infants
s
Without Fmniligs published in 1944, presents
same fascinating data on one of the questions. Such invatigatiom
have not proved fatal to p s y c ~ l y s i sbut on the contrary have
fostered the growth of its theory and praCtia.
A paper by Dr. NoG. Gartshtein is primarily noteworthy for
attacking two articles that had been printed previously m the
MONTHLY
RBVEw by Dr. Lawrence Kubie (March 1958) and by
maelf (December 1957), the latter a reply to Dr. D. Fedotor?~
"The Soviet View of Psychoanalysis" which appeared in MR,
December 1957. There is nothing new in this paper. I am quoted as
saying. that Freud and his followers discwered an objective method
for the investigation of the brain, a remark which is held by Gartshtein to be completely unfounded. I agree. Moreover, I never made
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any such statement, which an examination of the original article (p.
61) will show. Translations from one language to another are occasional~inaccurate. But this sort of knocking down of straw men is
symptomatic of an over-defensiveness which would not need to be
resorted to if the Soviet official position were sound scientifically.
In my opinion the most significant part of this symposium
is contributed by Dr. P. K. Anokhin, who draws attention to the
need of a more profound and more concrete approach to Freudism
without over-simplification of Freudian views. The two most substantial remarks by Anokhin are: (1) "It was necessary to put
forward opposing scientific-materialistic data to explain those complex intimate questions which Freudism has monopolized, trying to
give them its own interpretation. I t must be remembered that Freudism has not remained constant; it has changed, and its arguments
have changed also. It cannot be said that Freudism ignores social
phenomena; it distorts their nature and gives an incorrect explanation
of people's behavior." (2) "It was necessary to squeeze Freudism out
of those scientific fields which it was trying to exploit for reactionary
ends, and to give a scientific-materialistic explanation of psychological
phenomena." The rest of the symposium is largely repetitious by
way of criticism of Freudian theory-particularly with relation to
dreams and psychosomatic medicine-and its application to sociology.
All this is old stuff except for the bit of yielding as to (1) the
importance of the unconscious in human motivation, (2) the admission that Freudian theory has been over-simplified, and (3) the
suggestion that its subject matter and content must be taken over by
the Pavlovians. This acknowledgement of the importance of the
content of psychological data, which has hitherto been ignored as a
kind of epiphenomenon, is in a sense new; but in the main, the antiFreudian arguments are old, largely polernic, and are based upon
incomplete appreciation of Freud's libido theory. For the most part
these critics continue the argument as if Freud had written nothing
since 1914 except the death instinct theory. The great advances that
have been made in ego psychology are ignored. Thus the promise of
a "new look" is disappointing.
A second contribution appeared in the October 1959 issue of
MONTHLY
REVIEWby Dr. Paul A. Baran on "Marxism and Psychoanalysis." This is a much more urbane, sophisticated, and knowledgeable approach to the subject than that of the Soviet scientists. It is

,
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tefreshkg to find that an econormst lue Baran has a better insight
into psychological processes than the Russian writers, who are so
steeped in the neurophysiological approaeh inherent in Pavlov. Baran
perceives something new on the horizon, a sort of amalgam of psychoanalysis with some quasi-Marxian sociological notions. This doctrine,
which he calls 'csocio-psychologism," holds that man is influ
by society, while equating "society" to the environment.
Let us follow Baran in what he considers the implications
socio-psychologism. First, he disposes of the theory that since human
nature determines the historical process and since human nature is
unalterable, all attempts to transform society are doomed. In contrast,
socio-psychologism holds that human development is determin
the social milieu, or the nature of interpersonal relationships,
which it follows that improvements can be made by suitable "adjustments" in the prevailing environment. Socio-psychologism, according
to' Baran, uncovers horrors in our culture and therefore is nearer
to the realities of capitalism, but it proceeds to blame our difficulties
on our own inefficiencies and refuses to see the fundamental causes
of bur problems in the very nature of capitalism itself. Baran holds
that Marxists are in error in combating such new versions of the
psychological approach by means of their old arguments, and that
it is a mistake not to extract what is good from socio-psychologism,
"whatever genuine insights may be submerged'' in this new approach.
'13axanysarguments are incisive, at times witty, at times sarcastic,
and at tiines erroneous. But as I indicated above, it is decidedly
refreshing to find a Marxist who does not hold that all of Freud is
bunk. Barmi acknowledges that Freud directed his studies to a
rational understanding of the irrational motivations in man. Where
Freud goes wrong in his view, is not in his aim h t in holdingthat
human nature is invariable. Baran believes that changes have taken
place in "human nature," for example, an increase in rationality
with changes in the methods of production. This has caused a chanp
in the mental habits of man. Baran's meaning is not entirely clear
here, but I take it that he means that magical thinking plays a smaller
role in the mental processes of man than previously.
Baran's thesis holds that the alienation of man from his means
of production leads to the madness of our economic system, which in
turn leads to the alienation of man from himself. Under such circumstances, human rationality becomes crippled and bears no relation-
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ship to the prerequisites for and the needs of human health, happiness,
and development. Another way of stating his thesis leads to the
conclusion that the conflict between "partial rationality" and "total
rationality" leads to man's psychological aberrations.
Baran concludes that irrationality in our times is not a development from unalterable human instincts, but rather that advances in
capitalism have led to a radical subjugation of the nature of man
himself. Whereas previously violence was used by the ruling class
to keep the workers down, now the capitalist enforces a subtler
"adjustment." Now the worker has become a more diligent, docile,
efficient, and reliable worker, but a high price has been paid in the
loss of spontaneity. Again Baran's superior approach leads him to
say, in contrast to the Russians quoted above, that he does not think
this is a plot on the part of capitalists to turn workers into "diligent,
docile, efficient, and reliable workers," but that this trend derives
from an inherent characteristic of a mode of production which is
based upon commodity exchange.
Baran's thoughts lead him to make an almost heretical remark
that Marx, Engels, and Freud all strove towards the same goal: to
increase human happiness via freedom of individual development and
the capacity to experience sensual gratifications. However, he holds
that under capitalism aggression is so disciplined and channeled
toward the attainment of success that it leads to what Freud called
the "alienation of man from himself." Therefore, according to
Baran, the only change that is possible in man must come as a
result of a change in the framework of his socio-economic condition.
Baran's ideas, which I have of course abbreviated, are superior
to the neurophysiological approach of the Russians in holding that
at least there are innate biologically determined drives that do play
a role in psychic development. However, he stumbles on the old
anti-Freudian dogma that human nature is unalterable and that all
attempts to transform human character are therefore doomed. If the
innate biologically-determined, instinctual drives have shown a certain
fixity, it does not follow that their derivatives cannot change. As a
matter of fact, it is the effort to understand the very effects of
all sorts of forces on the innate structure which constitutes one of
the major objectives of psychoanalytic study. Moreover, Baran's
argument falls back on an old saw, namely, that treatment of emotional disturbances invariably tends to take the fight out of an individual
and make him adjust to his environment.
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B m ' s psychdogid contribution lies in his belief that human
ss d e n 4 by an increase in man's rationality
as methods of &ductim have progressed, and that this pogres~
has produced changes in the mental habits of man. This interesting
thesis is a simplified attempt to account for whatever changes have
taken place in the coiuae of man's historical development. To attempt
to cover this subject would necessitate an extremely long exposition,
and I shall therefore restrict myself to only one pint. Baran seems
to ignore! that rhere is onto-genetic development of the psyche, which
is of necessity a very slow procerr. Fmm a condition in which magical
thinLing holds -7 the& gradually develops a variety of educatik
pmesses which lead to rational thinking. Moreover, there are forms
of magical infantile thinking that remain throughout each individual's
life. If this kind of magical thinking is what Baran means by "human
nature))' then I hold that it is likely to remain unchanged so long as
man exists on this planet. If the Marxist ideal is the production of
nature has changed,

infants who are born with a perceptual, discriminative, and executive
psychical apparatus that can at birth distinguish between Mozart
and boogie-woogie and have a knowledge of the calculus and the
Bill of Rights, I hold that this is a form of sheer irresponsible qealism
which is being foisted on the masses as one of the new tranquilizers.
Further, by putting emphasis upon rationality versus irrationality,
Baran misses the point of the difference between emotional life and
intellectttal life. The relationship between the two is a most interesting
area of study, but the equation of rationality and healthy emotional
life, implying as it does that the healthy human being must be
an intellectual, is taking for granted much more than there is any
,
warrant for in Baran's argument.
In our present social structure there is much to foster irrational
drives toward success and a sadistic type of competitive life. I t draws
out much of what is aggressive in ourselves and distorts love relationships, affection, mutual respect, and cooperation. But to suggest that
a socialist transformation of the socio-economic structure will per se
make for major changes in hunian nature and in the human psyche3
though a consummation apparently to be wished, is, to use Baran's
own phrase, "claptrap." Nor can Baran take refuge in the argument,
which he implies, that whatever defects exist in present-day socialist
societies are vestiges of the capitalist order. A +ser interpretation;is
one suggested by Engels, that. under socialism man would cease
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suffering like an animal and begin to suffer like a human being. But
Baran's fatering of the thesis that economic changes in t h d v e s
will resolve human problems is a form of sheer irresponsibility.
If Baran really believar that his thesis is scientific and not merely
an article of faith, then he should be able to demonstrate hav a
psychological system b d on J h h x k t could step by step indicate
how economic Changes would influence cultura.l patterm, whieh in
turn would influence the family structure, which in turn would
influence interpersonal relationships, which in tum would influace
psychodynamic mechanisms and psychic development. Any systematic
attempt to explain what Baran holds as his h i S need not follow
exactly the above fornula, to be sure, but at least it should avoid
the mythological monstrosity that methods of production have a
direct effect upon the human psyche. Even the followem of Pavlov
would not hold that changes in the methods of production cause
directly observable changes in patterns of cerebral-neuronal activity.
This even they would recognize as pseudo-Marxism.
Dialectical materialism in psychology should be able to propose
(1) a systematic theory of the development of the psyche, which
would serve as a basis for some sort of study of biologically determined
drives and their vicissitudes under different conditions; (2) a theory
of symptom-formation; and (3) a theory of treatment. At present
the official Soviet position has, at best, no theory of psychic develop
ment (a remarkable thing in view of the emphasis of M d t s on
the historical approach) ; a neurophysiological theory of symptomformation which is detached from emotional problems as such and
considers the content of symptoms as meaningless waste products;
and a chaotic theory of treatment made up of a conglomerate of
biochemical, neurophysiological, and social elements, all essentially
doctrine-oriented rather than individual-oriented.
Two encouraging signs in regard to the problem of Manrirm and
Freudism do exist. One I pointed out in my earlier article in M R
(December, 1957) in which I stated that there were many things
incomplete and possibly inaccurate in psychoanalytic theory and
practice, but they were none of the items that are stressed in the Soviet
critiques. Psychoanalytic theory and practice are constantly being
revised in the light of new findings in experimental and clinical fields,
and the best place to find these changes is in the psychoanalytic
journals themselves. They illustrate that psychoanalysts are self-
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critical. The second sign is one that I picked up from listening to
American psychiatrists who have spent time recently in visits to
psychiatric facilities in the USSR. In spite of official attitudes, when
these psychiatrists have discussed clinical material (and not theory)
with Soviet colleagues they found in the more advanced clinical
centers little reliance upon official theory, but a reliance upon an
understanding of psychodynamics and a growing clinical experience
which is essentially sound from the American observers' point of view.
This is not the first time that theory and practice have not gone
hand in hand, and is illustrative of something that has been frequently
pointed out: that sooner or later if one attempts to treat individuals
he must perforce come in contact with and treat patients via a
dynamic psychotherapy; he must perforce come to the utilization of
Freudian concepts whether he acknowledges them or not.

REPLY
BY P A U L A .

BA-RAN

Although differing among themselves in emphasis and detail, the,
preceding observations on my lecture ccMarxismand Psychoanalysis"
center on three broad issues. First, the scope of the human predicament in our society; seccmd, the causes of the prevailing condition;
and third, the extent to which currently practiced psychotherapy
may be able to cure individuals seeking its help. While it would far
transcend my competence to attempt to ''cover" even approximately
such formidable ground, I will try a necessarily brief summary of
my principal reflections on the views advanced by my critics.
The first issue is raised most explicity by Dr. Krich. "All of us,"
he writes, "live under monopoly capitalism, but only 15 percent of
us break down under its pressure or are seized with its 'macromadness.' The rest of us hang on to our culture's 'microsense."'
This statement reveals, I submit, that its author missed not only the
point of my lecture but, what is much more serious, he has missed
the intent and content of the theoretical work of both Marx and
Freud. For neither Marx's sociology nor Freud's psychology is concerned solely or even primarily with social and psychic pathology,
with pronounced, diagnostically identifiable social or psychic illness
calling for specific, pragmatic therapy. At least in this regard Mam
and Freud were treading on the same ground. Both were seeking
to comprehend the visible pathological excrescences of social existence in their relation to the "statistical norm," to discern in the
condensed, one might say exaggerated, manifestation of suffering the
less intense but universal malaise hidden beneath the relatively calm
surface of everyman's everyday life. Treating these excrescences as
"deplorable exceptions" that have to be explained, and if possible
cured, may well be a legitimate preoccupation of what Krich commends as "clinical empiricism," but it is certainly not conducive
to insight into the fundamental problem involved. Indeed, far
from referring exclusively to the "15 percent of us [who] break
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down," the problem is precisely the nature of the culture to which
the 85 percent "hang an"-the
culture that produces the more or
less violent breakdown of the "only" 15 percent, and the moro or
less supportable mk4re psychologique (Freud) of the 85 percent.
This is not the place to attempt a description of this culture or to
detail its repressive, irrational, neurosh-breeding characteristics.
Some of the relevant consideratione were indicated briefly in my
lecture and there is abundant material on this subject in the
sociological and psychological literature. Whether we examine the
gerieral cultural standards of our society or the prevailing state of
education, whether we consider race relations or juvenile delinquency,
whether we think about the increasingly pronounced breakdown of
the family or the incidence of alcoholism and suicide-there can be
no doubt about the illness of our society, about the glaring incomptibility of its institutions with the health, happiness, and develop
ment of man. To be quite clear about it: the question relates not to
the subjective reaction to the prevailing condition on the part of
those whom it affects. Even if all 100 percent of society, not only
Krich's 85 percent, were cantent to "hang on'' to the existing state
of affairs, the finding of the objective inadequacy of the existing
social order would remain valid. What is more, such a state
of mass intoxication and "tranquilization" .would in itself represent
the most conspicuous and indeed most dangerous aspect of the entire
pathological syndrome. It can r b e , and usually is, objected that under
such circumstances there would #beno criteria left for judging an
existing state of society. Freud was fully aware of this difficulty even
if d y implicitly indicating a solution: "In the neurosis of an
individual we can use as a starting point the contrast presented to
us between the patient and his m\;ironment which we assume to be
'normal.' No such background as this would be available for any
society similarly affected; it would have to be supplied in some other
way." (Sigmund Freud, Cwilizatwn and Its Discontents, London,
1955, p. 142. Italics added.) This "other way" is social
thought-the age-old philosophical, scientific, artistic, and practical
effort to develop standards for man's "right way of life," to clarify
the concept' of what constitutes a "good society." What Dr. Krich
haughtily d i s m b e s because of "operational inutility" is actually
not just my modest bit of theorizing but all of the truth-searching
tradition of mankind, whether it has found expression in the Bible
or in the Koran, in the meditations of the Greek philosophers or in

the creations of the Renaissance artists, in the writings of' Shalrispare and Tolstoy, or in the far-flung studies of Marx and Freud.
All of these endeavors were "operationally useless"-+xcept that it
is thanks to just this unremitting, all-embracing quest for the cM.
ication and creation of the prerequisites of the "good life" that
we are able today to specify with much more precision than in earlier
times what the conditions are that need to be fulfilled for the
somatic and psychic welfare and growth of man. The denial of the
possibility. to identify, let alone establish, such conditions reflects
either the ideological blinkers of empiricist agnosticism that (by no
m e fortuitously) obscure intellectual vision in our society, or,
(worse still), the vested interests of those whose primary concern
is to discredit theoretically and obstruct practically all radical departure from the status quo.
It is with reference to these indispensable conditions for human
welfare that we have to examine the problem explicitly or implicitly
raised by all my critics: whether there has been and is a c&tinual
improvement of human life within the framework of the capitalist
order. The answer is far from simple. There has been in this country
as well as in other advanced capitalist countries a tremendous development of productive resources* It has resulted in a considerable rise
of the standard of living and in an equally pronounced reduction
of the burden of human toil. The process of rationalization and
enlightenment to which this growth of productivity is intimately
related has also led to a certain liberalization of mores and to a
certain relaxation of tabus, weakening the reign of superstition and
obscurantism. Yet i t would be inadmissibly rash to jump from these
undeniable facts to the conclusim that these processes have impr6ved the psychic welfare of people. Comparisons over time are
notoriously difficult, particularly if what is to be compared are psychic
stites of different people at different times, but a strong case can
be made for the proposition that the material advances attained
under capitalism have been bought at a very high price in terms of
repression and alienation. In the words of m e expert, speaking for
many, "There is no indication that the mental health of tbe nation
has improved. Delinquency is s t d y rising; juvenile drug addicts
probably run into tens of thousands (a phenomenon unknown in any
other part of the Western world) ; we constantly hear of infantile
schizophrenics, and the number of neurotics is certainly not less than
it was under the sternest Victorian upbringing." (Dr. Melitta

P A U L A.

BARAN

Schmideberg, director of clinical service, Association for the Psychiatric Treatment of Offenders, in Phi Delta Kappan, December,
1959.) The rise of juvenile delinquency-probably one of the most
eloquent indices of the deterioration of the psychic state of young
people and of the conditions obtaining in their families--cannot be
disputed :
The records of juvenile courts, compiled by the Children's
Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
show that the number of children brought before the courts
increased from 300,000 in 1948 to 435,000 in 1953. Only 10 percent of this increase could be explained by the growth of the
juvenile population. The court figures show the trend, but they
do not show the full extent of juvenile delinquency. The Senate
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency estimates that there are at
least three juvenile offenders brought to the attention of the
police for every child actually brought to court. So, at the
current rate, the number of youngsters who get into trouble with
the police each year is about one million and a quarter. If the
rate continues to rise, as it has since 1948, the number will reach
1,700,000 in 1960. (Irving Adler, What We Want Of Our
Schools, New York, 1957, pp. 109-110.)

Is there any justification for the view, apparently held by Dn.
Neubauer and Krich, that it is an important "offset" to this profound illness of society that in our time there has been an increase
in sexual activity, that now "we find not only inhibition but also
the opposite--selfish indulgence with insufficient controls"? (Neubauer) It is surely a remarkable kind of "depth psychology" which
judges the intensity of repression endured and the extent of genuine
gratification experienced by people on the basis of the "turnover
in the sex market" as measured by the number of sexual transactions registered by Kinsey and kindred researchers. One might
have hoped that, if nothing else, this fallacy of psychological reasoning would be put to rest by the work of Freud. Indeed, it would
seem to me that the very opposite of what is maintained by Drs.
Neubauer and Krich comes nearer the truth. As the objective possibilities for human liberatian from want and toil and exploitation
expand, as the gap between the freedom that could be realized on
the basis of the attained development of productive resources and
the misery enforced by the capitalist order widens, the repressive
function of capitalist institutions and culture becomes more rather
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than less pronounced, the mechanisms enforcing "adjustment," conformity, and passive "hanging on" become more elaborate and more
pervasive. And the more the realktian of society's objective potentialities comes to depend on people's capacity to seize the historic
opportunity, the stronger becomes the dependence of the system
on obscuring and confusing the issues, on the denial of the very
existence of those potentialities, and on the cultivation of a sense
of contentment with such pseudo-happiness, pseuddove, and
pseudo-productivity as may be attainable within the capitalist order.
The resulting state of deception, delusion, and paralysis thus turns, in
the current phase of capitalist development, into the principal
obstacle to human advancement.
This brings me to the second question raised by my critics,
namely, the causes of the existing situation. Here Dr. Reider is
flogging a dead or a wrong horse when inveighing against the
"sheer irresponsibility" or "mythological monstrosity" of a view that
"economic changes in themselves will resolve human problems," or
that "methods of production have a direct effect upon the human
psyche." The key words in those sentences are clearly the ones that
I have underscored: "in themselves" and "direct." But who ever
claimed that economic changes in themselves have a direct effect
upon the human psyche? Certainly not Marx who repeatedly returned to the intricate relation between the socio-economic base and
the so-called "superstructure," and whose concept of alienation encompasses the very heart of the psychoIogical problem. Nor can
it be fairly said about the lecture to which my critics have addressed
themselves that it postulates a "direct" relation between the
economic and the psychic spheres. There I was concerned precisely
with the mediations between those two realms, with what might be
called the "transmission belts" which connect the relations of production prevailing in a given epoch to the psychic structure of the
individuals living in that epoch. In fact, the lecture represents
nothing if not an attempt to draw attention to some of these
"transmission belts" which are usually ignored or sidestepped in
psychological thought. And since the role played by i n t r a f d y
relations is surely not one of modem psychology's neglected stepchildren, I did not feel an urgent need to emphasize a factor the
importance of which is generally recognized even if not always put
in the proper theoretical context.
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If it is an impmnidble wershplification and wlgarkation
of Marxian thought to disregard the "txan&on
belts,'? and to
consider the ~gychicprocesses as a simple, direct reflection of m c b
ecbnamic relations, it is even more erroneous and more dangerous to
treat these ' ' - d o n
belts" not for what they a m but as ultimate,
imdueible sources of human conduct. This position is the essenee
of what I called psychologism arid leads inevitably to postulatingqan
abtonomous psyche producing and reproducing itself in the lofty realm
of the spirit fax removed from the concrete, material bases of humexistence; And the ccmythologicalmonstrosity" of such a concept
of the human eoul is not banished in the least by a "generous"
acknowledgement that there may be after all some "interdependence'' between the psychic sphere and that of the forces and relations of production. For the mere recognition of the existence of
interdependence means very little both theoretically and practically
unless it is accompanied by the idenflication of the active, leading
component in the interrelation. There is not much to be gained from
what may look at first like the profound wisdom of the pmpositiari
that everything depends on everything else. The crux of the matter
is to discover what accounts primarily for the dynamics of the entire
structure, what constitutes the Archimedian point from which it
r y y be possible to move, to change the wble system. The neglect
of this consideration leads both to theoretical sterility and to practical impotence. Thus Erich Fromm's insistence "that progress can only
occur when changes are made simultaneously in.the economic, sociopolitical 'and culbval spheres; that any progress restricted to oire
sphere is destructive to progress -in all spheres" (The Sane Society,
pp. viii-lr, italics in the original), while appearing to be most radical,
would justify the . renunciation from ,all meaningful action. Since
social energies are limited, since different changes require different
time spans, since finally some changes are more important than
others-if for no other reason than because once undertaken .they
cause or f d t a t e other, derivative changes-the categoric iGFtik that either all changes should take place at the same time or
n o k be undertaken at all amounts practically to a counsel of passivity, to support for the status quo.
It should be needless to say that the recognition of the necessity to assign different weights to different elements in a relation,
that the emphasis on the inequality of the strength and influence of
different forces making up the historr'd process is not the same*

as the assignment of an e x c l u h , "dire~t,~'causative
function to any
one W c u l a r factor (or combination of factors). What it does mean
is that changes in certain areas are more important, more -urntial than changes in other areas, that action exercised in one segment
of the whole has a greater impact on the whole than action e m m k d
in other segments. Accordingly the Marxist view that the relations
of production and the socio-economic structure resting upon them
play a crucially important part in shaping dl aspects of human existence not only does not exclude but indeed demands the concrete
specification of intemnediate links, of all the complex intmIatkns
which weld the disparate facets of the social process into an organic
whole.
But, to repeat, the recognition of the existence of this cmpIex
interrelation should not be permitted to k c m e the night m which
all cats are gray. It is not the psychic makeup of the walker that has
caused the emergence of the giant corporation or of the automated
factory. It is the objective economic process that brought into being
these institutions of monopoly capitalism, and these institutions of
monopoly capitalism have exercised a profound impact on tht psychic
structures of the individuals caught in their nets. And this daa not
imply that employment in an autcmated factory "by itself" changes
"directly" the psyche of the worker, nor does it mean that in some
way even the changes that do take place in the psyche of the worker
have no "feedbacky' effect on the working principles of the corporation or the factory. What it does call for-and imperatively~-is
dealing with first things first, distinguishing betwan roats and
branches, the attribution of the movement of the carriage to the
horse rather than to the cart.
In the light of these consideratims one can only rub me's epes
in astonishment at Dr. Neubauer's aqument: 'When we q I o r e
the causes of, let us say, a phob'la, our patients do not inform w
that their central conflict stems f m their relationship to social institutions or from their role in connection with the means af production." This is indeed "clinical empiricismyygone wild! What w d d
be the need for any analysis if all we had to do to estabbh the
causes of any human and social phenomenon were to ~+$~tes whsrtever. information may be supplied by the individuals affected? I
wonder how many somatic patients inform their phY;cians that the
Koch bacillus is the cause of the tuberculosis of their lungs, or haw
many mental patiemts inform their therapists that their infmtile
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fantasies or the methods of child rearing to which they were exposed
have something to do with their character formation? And for that
matter, how many businessmen report that their profits or losses are
due to certain developments in the realm of aggregate saving and
investment? As Marx once remarked, "all science would be superfluous if the appearance of things caincided directly with their
essence."
When it comes to the third issue raised in the preceding articles
-the therapeutic value of psychoanalysis-the
discussion becomes
difficult indeed. Having no professional qualifications in this area,
I must canfine myself to a few theoretical observations. As stated in
the concluding paragraph of my lecture, I do not deny the "possibility of 'individuals who are ill finding a measure of relief through
currently available means of psychiatric treatment." In other words,
I am perfectly willing to grant that psychiatry (of whatever doctrinal
orientation) may be capable of enhancing the patient's ability to
cope with the surrounding reality and/or to carry his travails with
a lessened sense of unhappiness. Yet, as Freud recognized, "neurosis
and psychosis are both of them an expression of the rebellion of the
id against the outer world, of its 'pain)) unwillingness to adapt itself
to necessity . . or, if one prefers, of its incapacity to do so." ("The
Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis," Collected Papers, Vol.
11, p. 279.) This raises a problem of the utmost importance. The
"outer world" against which the "idy' rebels is both a physical and a
social world; on the one hand, the hardships, privations, and -toil
imposed by scarcity and the effort required by man's struggle with
nature; on the other hand, the repression, compulsion, and suffering
which a social order based upon the exploitation of man by man
inflicts upon the individual. To be sure, both of these "outer worldsyy
are aspects of the same reality; it is indispensable, however, to see
them in their unity and dialectical interaction as well as in their
specificity and differentiation. For to the extent to which the
individual rebels against the constraints of the physical world and
the oppressiveness of the social order founded upon and resulting
from it, his rebellion i s a rebellion against what Freud refers to as
66necessity." Insofar, however, as the oppressiveness of the social order

.

is no longer a reflection and inevitable outgrowth of physical scarcity
but a means for the perpetuation of the existing relations of production in the interests of a privileged, exploitative minority, to this
extent the individual's rebellion ceases to be a rebellion against
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"necessity." If he is caught-as he usually +in the comprehensive
network of bourgeois ideology, the main tenet of which is the treatment of so~klrelations as if they were physical, natural relations, his
rebellian becomes misguided, shifts from the actual source of his
suffering to an imaginary source and develops into a destructive and
self-destructive drive. Only if he is capable of piercing the fog of
bourgeois mentality and of recognizing that it is the social order in
which he lives that blocks the attainment of genuine plenty and the
growth, development, and freedom of man, can the individual turn
his rebellion against the real obstacles to his happiness and thus direct
his protest against a meaningful target. To avoid a possible misunderstanding: I do not mean to suggest that the social order and its
injunctions do not confront the individual as a necessity. The necessity involved is, however, a dialectical necessity: ineluctable and inexorable at one stage of historic development, it is brittle and overthrowable at another-given sufficient determination, courage, and
insight on the part of people.
If psychoanalysis would undertake to advance the individud's
understanding of the precise nature of the "outer worldy' which imposes upon him his privations and his suffering and thus reorient his
protest from fetishes to the actual causes of his distress, it would
perform a progressive task. Yet such has not by any means been the
function of psychoamlysis, as pointed out by Dr. Lehrman. Freud
himself, as well as most of his followers, subsumed both aspects of
the "outer worlds'-the physical and the social-under the concept
of "necessity," with this necessity seen as stemming from essentially
unalterable biologically determined libidinous drives. Even some
sociologically-minded writers such as C. Wright Mills and Herbert
Marcuse, tend unwittingly to obscure the matter by attributing the
ccnecessity" of the "outer world" in the present historical epoch
to "civilization" or to "modern industrid societyy' rather th& to
the specific, concrete socio-economic relations of monopoly capitalism. Quite naturally, if the "outer world" is considered to be an
immovable wall, or, as in socio-psychologism, a somewhat elastic
but essentially unchangeable enclosure-the only way of dealing
with the problem of the individual is to reduce as much as possible
his unwillingness or incapacity to adapt himself to this situation, to
curtail and destroy his individuality. What Dr. Reider derisively
refers to as an "old saw9'-that "treatment of emotional disturbances
invariably tends to take the fight out of an individual and make him
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;

adjust to his enVir0nrnent"-is
not a fortuitous outcome of
,
therapy cawed by the way it is "often practiced" (Dr. Lehrman);
it is related to the very nature of the cure that it sets out to proride.
And this is not contradicted by such successes as it may be able to
attain. For these successes consist at best in "transfers" of individuals
from Dr. Krich's 15 percent group to Dr. Krich's 85 percent group.
It is very far from my wish to minimize the vital importance of such
a "transfer" to the suffering individual. No price in resignation, in
"life adjustment," in tranquilizatim may be too high for him to
pay for some ability to get along, to "hang on," to experience some
modicum of gratification. It s h d d be clear, however, that this
outcome is a cure only in the limited sense of "killing the pain."
A genuine solution of the human predicament in the present
stage of our development is not achievable except through a farreaching txmsforrnation in the basic existential conditions of society.
The process of production which under capitalism dominates man
must be brought under his conscious control and turned from a
governor into a tool of his life. This is an indispensable pre,
requisite for true human freedom and therefore also the fundammtd
requiremest for the growth and devdopment of the indiuidd. Dr.
Neubauer is grievously mistaken in saying that "when man shall
have mastered society . we will still have need for a science of the
individual and his inner me." (Italics added.) It is exactly the other way round! Only when the socio-economic apparatus of r e p d o n ,
domination, and exploitation i s destroyed and replaced by an "association in which the free development of each is the condition r
for the free development of all" (Marx and Engels)--anly then will
there be a real "science of the individual and his inner life,'# for
only then will there be a possibility for the existence and flowering
of the individual himself. Only when the "furies of private pmpt?rty9'
are tamed and eventually banished, only when the repressive, destructive, and dehumanizing relations and ideology of capitalism are
rendered fossils of a dark past-nly
then will people be able to face
directly and to deal rationally with the challenges, the perplexities,
add the immense potentialities encompassed by the human sod,
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APPENDIX
THE SOVIET VIEW' OF, PSYCHOANALYSIS
BY D. F E D O T O V , M. D.

In the Soviet Union we greatly honor everything of genuine
worth in our own national as w d as in world science. We cherish
the germs of human reasan that have come down to us from past
millennia, such a9 the writings of Hippocrates and the Canon of
medical science by Abou-Ali-IbnSina (Avicenna) ; we revere the
heroic labors of Edward Jenner and the immortal work of Elie Mecb
nikov; we admire the scientific realism of Claude Bernard and the
immense intellectual sweep of Ivan Sechenov. Contrary to the d u m nies of our ill-wishers, in no other land ie there such profound respect
for Charles Danvin and Paul Ehrlich, for Luther Burbank and
Louis Pastew: as in ours. We appreciate the scientific comtribution
of Edward Fleming and the strict objectivity of the outstanding
researches of Walter Cannm. And when we speak of the great Ivan
Pavlov, the creator of the materialist conception of the higher nervous
activity, we at the same time bear in mind that this conception could
not have been formulated without the previous labom of Sechenov
as well as the great legacy *f DDaMrin's creative genius,
We value highly the works of the advanced scholars of today.
But while paying due respect to everything which is truly scientific
and serves man's progress, we cannot indifferently let pass theories
that are anti-scientific and that drag human reason bac-d.
One
such theory, widely held in several countries, is that of psychdysis,
the creation of the A u s h . neurmpathologist Sigmund Freud.
I have received a kind invitation from the editors of this journal
to express myself on the subject indicated in the title. I am glad to
do so..
First,it should be pointed out that .whilein the 19208, and earlierY
a nmber of physicians in the Soviet Union did evince some interest
in psychoanalysis, at the present time Swiet physicians, paychologkts,
Dr. F~dotovis Director of the Znstitutr .of Psychiatry of the Ministry
of Hsatth af the USSR.
.
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and physiologists read psychoanalytic works d y for the purpose
of keeping in touch with the scientific interests of our cqlleagues
abroad.
To meet this purpose of the Soviet scholars, our libraries subscribe to books and journals on psychoanalysis, dang with other publications issued abroad. Also, a number of psychoandytic works, pmticularly the major works of Freud, are available in Russian translation and are thus accessible to our readers.
But neither the theoretical works of the psychoanalysts nor their
practical activities satisfy Soviet scholars and physicians. Indeed,
both are rejected as lacking in scientific substance.
The reasons why this attitude toward psychoanalysis has become
established in the Soviet Union cannot be grasped without taking
into account the tremendous significance that Pavlov's teachings
and the materialistic view in general have assumed in Soviet science.
Freud and his followers have been unable to find a method
for the objective exploration of the physiology of the brain. At the
same time, Pavlov's teaching has provided science with a tremendously significant method for such exploration. At the present time,
both here and abroad, including the United States, a great deal is
being done toward the mastery and development of Pavlov's teachings, and methods are being worked out for the objective exploration of the brain's functioning. The methods of conditioned reflexes
and electroencephalography, particularly, are assuming evw greater
importance. In this way, the progress of true science is providing
studcats with a means for the objective investigation of psychic
processes.
Yet the psychoanalysts persist in ignoring the achievements of
science and continue to treat psychic processes as something utterly
independent of the physiological processes in the brain, the bask of
psychic activity. In his Lectures on Psychoanaly.k, Freud wrote that
in its investigations psychoanalysis must cast aside all anatomical,
chemical, and physiological theories as irrelevant and must operate
d y with psychological concepts that are specifically psychoanalytic.
This position of Freud's continues to characterize, in essence, psychoanalytic work to the present time.
Our materialistic view renders such a dichotomy between the
psyche and its material base quite unacceptable. In this ignoring by
psychoanalysis of the scientific discoveries in the physiology of the
brain we discern a reactionary tendency to drag science backward.
I
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This position of psychoanalysis, the position of separa.td@be
psyche from the brain, has, quite naturally, a negative effect in
practice. We will permit ourselves only one example.
The psychoanalysts have often turned their attention to ulcerous
affections. A number of American authors, starting from psychoanalytic positions, have attempted to solve the problem by considering exclusively psychic factors. Thus, one of the leaders of American psychoanalysis, F. Alexander, asserted in an article which appeared a few years ago that at the basis of the etiology of ulcerous ailments lies a particularly intense and, by its very nature ungratified,
"oral-aggressive" urge to satiation, an urge that has been driven into
the unconscious. Hence the pathogenesis of ulcers is reduced to a
fantastic psychological mechanism. Let us see how the same ailment
is viewed by the proponents of Pavlovian views.
Academician K. M. Bykov (Leningrad) and his collaborator
I. T. Kurstin, after thorough research, established that the etiology
of ulcers is compounded of many factors: type of higher nervous
activity, presence of characteristic "ulcerous diathesis," regimen of
eating, living conditions, disturbance in the functioning of the vegetative nervous system, and various changes in the biochemistry of the
organism. Such a broad understanding of the etiology of ulcers
naturdly determines the system of treatment. We are convinced that
the one-sided view of the psychoanalysts in this matter reflects
negatively on their handling of patients, and prevents the timely
application of necessary and truly useful methods of treatment.
Similar differences in the understanding and treatment of sicknesses may be cited without end.
We are definitely at variance with the psychoanalytic trends in
the understanding of the nature of the psyche. We start from the
premise that the psyche is a reflection in the brain of objectively
existent reality. Human consciousness reflects human existence and
this insures the oneness of man and his environment. This is not
the view held by Freud or by any of the later psychodytic schools.
In psychoanalytic theory, the role of the external world in forming
the psyche is extremely limited. The psychoanalytic schools clhg to
the notion that the unconscious is a separate subdivision of the pychi,
essentially independent of the external world, the environment, and
one that exerts a decisive influence on man's consciousness. an
is thus fenced off from the world, from the reality of which he is
a part and outside bf which, indeed Gthout- his oneness with which,

be is inconceivable. Thus psychoanalysis ignores the role of the
w e d envircmment in man's pysche, it d d e s man's.d essence.
This psy&aaxmlytic conception, too, affects quite negatively psycho-,
d y t i c -practice. Here, too, we shall give one example.
In the USSR we are dl against war, against aggrmiw and
a g g r m . We strive to foster in our children a love for peace and.
a feeling of frimdship for all people, and races of all lands. Psychoanalysis bases itself on the false proposition that man is by nature
a#gpidve. Freud, in a letter to the fsunous Einstein, wrote that war
was "a perfectly natural thing; unquestionably, it has a sound pq+
blogicd baris and, in fact, it can scarcely be avoided." (Letters,
Vole V.) P$ychiatrists in America holding to psychoanalytic positions
(at least some of them) advise the providing of children with
"atomic toys))' with comics d o w i n g in atrocious crimes. This on
the asamption that they would provide an outlet for children's
aggressive tendencies. Such views cannot but further the spread of
the "war psychosis))' contribute to juvenile delinquency, and injure
the health of the young.
P s y c h d y t i c theory denies the historical development of man
and his psyche* The determining force in shaping man's conduct .iq,
the psychoadpts believe, instinct, particularly sex.
But the whole of n a t d science, the entire development af
scimce, indicates that the psyche is the product of historical development, the result of man's being primarily a creature of social forces.
The unbiased study of facts indicates rathex convincingly that it is
not the sexual instinct that p d d e s virtually all the stimuli for
human behavior, but, to the can*,
that the human personality
as a whole, shaped by h*ry
in a social setting, determines the
forms of instinctual manifestations.
Freud and his followers do not hesitate to propound a psycho-.
analytic theory of society and morals. They explain such phenomena
as national oppreesian, the behavior of criminids, the social activities
of .people as d e s t a t i m s of the same blind elemental forces,
innate instincts, and drives*
Characteristic in this connection, for example, is the . way in
which Freud attempts to explain the inferior status of women which,
as we know, exists in capitalist countries. Now this "inferk,ritfS
is wholly conditioned by the social structure of those countries.. But
unwilling to see this, Freud argued that because of the anatmic
diffezencess between the saes the wamen themse1ves see themeluies
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as having been subjected to castration and think it wrong to regard
"both sexes as equal in social position and worth." (Letters, Vol. V,
pp. 196-197.) .
It certainly is unthinkable that a scientifically unacceptable
theory can offer an acceptable methodology wen in one areaI the
area of treating nervous and psychic disorders.
Because of their disregard of the patho-physiologicd bases of
neuro-psychic disorders, the circle of which is excessively and impermissibly enhged by the proponents of psychoanalysis, the psychoanalysts underestimate the importance of modem methods of
medicinal treatment.
Psychoanallytic therapy f i i its attention on the sexual aspect
in the life of the patients. This unavoidably leaves a heavy imprint
on the patients, gives them a wrong orientation, and results in mord
tram
The psychoanalytic method of treatment, furthermore, fixes the
patient's attention on the distant past, on early childhood, even on
the prenatal period. This too pulls the patients away from the
present, from the real conflicts in their immediate existence, and from
their real and immediate perspectives. Surely it can scarcely be
thought that the neuroses developed by an unemployed worker who
has been deprived of a livelihood for himself and his family, by a
mother who has lost a child, and by a do-nothing whose neurosis
arose out of idleness and boredom, out of satiation and lack of any
interests, all spring essentially from the same causes that had had
their origin in the remote past. We hold that, while due consideration'
must be given to early, real, proved, and not imagined psychological
traumata, the doctor's main attention in the treatment of neurotics
must be centered on their present life, on the perspectives of the
immediate future; that in the pf~cessof psychotherapy the physician
must keep closer to what presently disturbs the patient.
Psychoanalysts cite positive results allegedly obtained '&rough
psychoanalytic treatment. The apparent cures of which they boast
are, however, in fact but temporary improvements. Such impmve--.
ments have also been obtained by witch doctors -with patients who
had blind faith in them. These seeming cures have been known since
ancient times,. the results of most varied-"healing" methods. The*
are all based on the power of suggestion, ;he physiological nature of
which has been established by Pavlw and his followers. In this connection, we can refer to the many observations appearing in the

literature abroad indicating how unstable are the results obtained
by the methods of psychoanalytic treatment.
The source of neuroses is traceable to the social relations among
people. Neuroses, as Pavlov thought, are affections conditioned by
the imposition of excessive demands on the nervous system, in particular, the mental and physical strain resulting from painful experiences (psychic traumas).
This makes possible the development of sound methods for the
prevention of neurotic and other psychic disorders. A knowledge
of the physiological mechanisms of neuroses makes possible rational
medical and psychotherapeutic action.
I t is quite different with psychoanalytic theory which reduces
the problem of therapy to the digging up and baring of "complexes"
of "suppressed desiresyyin the realm of the unconscious.
As we see it, Freudism finds itself-in crying contradiction to the
optimistic tendencies of modem progressive science. Instead of exact
knowledge based on experiment and verified in life, it proffers arbitrarily concocted hypothetical schemes. Instead of paying proper
regard to the potency of human reasan, Freudism asserts that man
and his knowledge are under the sway of elemental inborn forces.
Instead of viewing man as the product of socio-historical development, an integral part of his social milieu, Freudism, in substance,
affirms the unrelatedness of man's conduct to the multiplicity of
external canditions.
Is it not clear that human progress cannot be achieved by irrational and telwlogical investigations?
Only true science, based on principles of materialistic cognition,
will secure the further development of human knowledge and help
achieve significant successes in revealing ever more of nature's secrets.
We see Freudism as a form of reaction to the magnificent successes of materialistic scientific knowledge in the fields of physiology
and medicine. In this it is not alone. Among the reactionary forces
arrayed against genuine science belongs everything that bases itself
not on principles of exact scientific method, but on speculative constructions masked as science.
In a fit of candor, Freud himself admitted in a letter to Einstein that his activity was an adventure in science. This, it seems to
me, is the most sipifickt of all of Freud's utterances. Freudism
was and is an admitted instance of adventure in science. This is the
reason why in our country it enjoys neither popularity nor r&sFt.

,

A P S Y C H O A N A L Y S T REPLIES
BY N O R M A N REIDER, M . D .

It was kind of the editors to ask me to write a reply to Dr.
Fedotov's comments about psychoanalysis. It is with mixed feelings
that I have agreed to do so, because it is a sort of useless gesture
to reply in any polemic way to old arguments which are largely
derivative of an official governmental stand of long duration in the
Soviet Union, which are not the result of an investigatory openminded attitude towards the nature of psychoanalysis, and which
arguments have been answered over and over again in the scientific
literature. Nevertheless, - the hopelessness of convincing Dr. Fedotov
to his satisfaction is somewhat mitigated by the anticipatian of a
receptiveness on the part of readers to the possibility that Dr. Fed*
tov's arguments are not the last word in the matter.
I cannot resist the temptation to pick point by point most of
the. arguments of minor nature throughout Dr. Fedotov's discourse
and to attempt to answer them briefly, after which I proceed to what
I consider the more valid scientific grounds for the difference of
opinion.
By way of initial summary, it can be said that Dr. Fedotov
simply does not understand psychoanalysis or he would not write
the way he does. For example, he states that Freud and his followers
have been unable to find a method for the objective exploration of
the physiology of the brain. It seems that to Dr. Fedotov psychology
can only be neurophysiological psychology. Freud made it clear that
he left the problems of the biology of man to the biologist, and of
the physiology to the physiologist. It is also amply clear to Freud and
his followers that there is no dichotomy between psyche and soma
as Dr. Fedotov would have one believe. Freud was primarily concerned with the psychic representation of biological phenomena and
not their physiology or chemistry, a fact that has never beem grasped
by many of his critics. Freud did not consMer anatomical, chemical,
and physiological theories as irrelevant. He considered them quite
important in their own field and he even went so far as to express
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the expectation that some day chemical means would be the method
of treating all psychiatric conditions.
An example that Dr. P&tov gives as tbe h o d m .result
of the deged sepa&ting off of psyche from soma in psychoanalytic
considerations is a brief quotation frqm Dr. F r a Alexander
~
about
the etiology of ulcers. This criticism of one aspect of r e k c h in
the psychic aspects of the etiology of ulcers, having mainly to do
with libidinal derivatives, is incorrectly represented as being the psychoanalyst's consideration of the total etiology. Psychoanalysts from
Freud on have acknowledged that the cor&itutiod diatheais and
numerous external factors play very si&icant roles in all psychosomatic conditiolis such as ulcers, and they make no bones about it.
That they happen to be interested to a great measure in the distribution and fate of certain kinds,of libidinal energy in psych0s0matic
*conditionsis as much justified as when a biochemist is concaned
in highly specialized studies in the cellular metaboIh of the tubercle
bacillus. One might criticize such work in the problem of tubesculo& in regard to many aspects, but one has no right to say - that
such work is valueless because it does not point out sufficiently the
social factors in the etiology of tubercuIosis. This is in effect what
Dr. Fedotov does.
Nowhere does Dr. Fedotav show his Iack of knowledge of Freud's
concepts more than in his statement that the import of the external
world in psychoa,nalytic theory is &tremely limited; the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious as having an influence on mads
conscious life by no means d e s the implication that man is thus
fenced off frmi the world, ''from the reality of which he is a part.)'
This is a naive conclusion that is not an inhekent part of psychoanalytic theory In the slightest. Nor are Freud's early psskktic
views on the in&tability of War n e c e s d y derivative frorn his
theories. Apparently h: Fedotw is not acquainted with Freud's
later opinions on war ivhich were considerably more optimistic. But,
alas,' it seems that Freud's earlier sociol0g;cal specu1ations have had
more dcati~n than his later ones.
Surely to attribute to Freud.or to his fol1owers any view that
they "advise the providing of children with 'atomic toys,' with
comics wallowing in atrocious crimes," sounds as if Dr. Fedotov has
fallen prey to a mite of propaganda. I know of no psychiatrists,
whether of psychoanalytic persuasion or not, who "advise" such
practices; I think that at worrit a-psychiatrist might on one occasion

or another resignedly condone them, making his dative inefftctiveness in hanging -the world.
.'Equdy striking in Dr. Fedotds evidence of misundentanding
of pdych6anslysis is the statement that Kpsychoanalytic theory denies
the 'historical.development of man and his psyche." It is the essential
core of psychoanalytic theory that it is a genetic psychology, a psychology that p 1 . a ~central importance upon the historical developmeht of the psyche. MOT-,
it is more explicit in its attempts to
show how instinchi farces, which are biologically determined, are
constantly undegoing changes under the influence of a t a n a l facton, a ' dislectical concept which has more universal applicability
than anything that has derived out of Pavlovian neurophysidogy or
any other system of5pq&oIogy, at least to date. It is also true that
psychoanalytic theory has atelred into considerations of sociology,
crMnoIogy, art, literature and other fields of human endeavor,
again via a universality due to the nature of the theory, a claim
w h i c h - m o t be made by B e c h t d n ar Pavlov's ~ e x o l o g y .
There is a curious contmdictioln in Dr. Fedotov's arguments.
He attacks psychodysis as being ahisboric m d then he attacks its
treatment method as laying ernphis upon individual hbtoxy. The
sw
sort of curious contradiction exists in his remark that the source
of newixes is traceable to the sodal relations among people, a
hypothesis which, afta agreement as to defiition of terms, would
be quite acceptable to & d y s t s
as a partid explanation of the
phenomenon of .
&
n
But Dr. Fedotov continua that, "Neuroses,
as Pavlov thought, i r e affectim conditioned by the imposition of
excessive demands on the nervous system.'s Now just what this has to
do with mial relations among people is not clear, nor is it then
clear why such great emphasis is placed upon the medical treatment
of .neuroses which are caused by social relations. Should they not,
therefore, be treated by social means exclusively? Yes and no, I
SUP-

-

TBk ~ r oft palemic discusdon could be continued, but I shall
leave t h ~ * p l e a a n t r i etso get to the basic h e . For sorm maron
or otha 'themihas been a fail- of Soviet psychologists to rec-e
the
essence af Freudian psychology. Their main attack stems
largely from the fact that they appreciate stme of Freud's concepts as
king "ide~~htic"rather than m a t e t i c . ThQ is quite strange,
e s m 1 since
~
' ~ d vehement
y
attacks upon psychoanalysis have
been made by c 6 ~ t i ~ e swho
, " w e e with the official definition
-
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of Freudianism in the 1955 Soviet edition of the Short Philosophic
Dictionary as a science "developing the basest and most repellant
instinctual tendencies"-only they call it materialistic and not idealistic! The point is that the theologian's arguments that Freudianism
has biologic roots are much closer to the roots than the Soviet view.
Yet both fear it (or at least do not like it) and it is interesting to
examine why. My own hunch is that all totalitarian systems have
to oppose psychoanalytic theory since one of its sociological implications is that of putting the welfare of the individual above the welfare of the state. This by no means settles the question, I fully realize.
What is likewise important is that there exists a considerable
literature, reference to which can most easily be found in Jones's
third volume of his biography of Freud, just recently published, of
extensive discources an psychoanalysis as dialectical materialism in psychology; this point of view has become quite unfashionable in recent
years, perhaps regrettably s-and,
then again, perhaps not-but at
any rate these arguments are quite cogent and most interesting. Perhaps the Soviet psychologists have no access to the psychoanalytic
literature of the 20s and 309, and that is why such references are
..
absent in the critique. Who knows?
To return: Freud discovered a method, analogous to those
methqds by which man's urine, sputum, feces, heart sounds, brain
waves, and gastric contents can be subjected to analysis and investigation; Freud found a way by which man's dreams, thoughts, wishes,
actions, imaginations, aspirations, reveries, and impulses can be
studied. He modeled his own theoretical considerations on those of
the physical sciences and achieved a consistent theory of the structure of the psychic apparatus, one of the greatest achievements of
the intellect, even though he himself humbly called it an "adventure
in science," a subtlety which escapes Dr. Fedotov. Psychoanalysis,
a result of his efforts, is not only a theory but it has now become a
body of knowledge and carries along with it a practice based upon
the theory. The everchanging and inquiring attitude of the relationship of the theory to the practice, not nearly as doctrinaire. as many
of its opponents would like to believe, is a remarkable advance in
scientific psychology, one which many socalled dialectical materialists would envy if they dared to understand it and give it a try.
Psychoanalysis has its defects in its theory and certainly in its
practice, but none of these are those that Dr. Fedotar mentions. .

